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Executive Summary 
This report compares the production, market and trade outcomes of two alternative EU agricultural 
policy scenarios, namely expiry of EU sugar quotas in 2015/16 and extension of the current sugar 
quota scheme. All other EU policy measures pertaining to the sugar sector, and to agriculture 
more generally, are assumed to be the same in both scenarios. The year of comparison is 2020. 
The CAPRI model was used for the simulations. Information available to the authors up to the end 
of 2012 was included in this study, as this was the end date of the scenario analyses and editing of 
the report. 
The report begins with a description of beet and sugar production within the EU, and outlines the 
policies applied in the sugar sector within the EU’s Common Agricultural policy. This is followed by 
a description of the workings of the EU market for sugar. 
A theoretical model is used to summarise the main functional relationships in the EU sugar market 
and related markets, and the EU’s trade in sugar. From this model, a number of theory-based 
predictions about the impacts of quota expiry are derived. There is then a brief overview of the 
CAPRI model and the way it has been used in this study.  
In the presentation of the simulation results, the outcomes that occur when quotas expire are 
presented in the form of differences from the hypothetical scenario according to which the quota 
scheme is extended until at least 2020. The main findings concerning these differential outcomes 
at EU level are given in the second column of the following table, headed ‘impacts of quota expiry 
(standard scenario)’. These impacts are all in line with those predicted and explained by the 
theoretical model. 
Summary of the simulation results. 
 
Impact on  
Impacts of quota expiry 
(standard scenario) 
Modification of the standard result 
when isoglucose takes an increasing 
share in the EU sweetener market1 
EU production of sugar beet & sugar Increase (ca. 4%) ↓ 
EU production of cereals Marginal increase (< 0.1%) ↓ 
EU ethanol production 
Marginal increase (< 0.1%), lower 
share of sugar as feedstock (-3 
percentage points) 
↑ 
EU sugar imports from high-cost 
countries Strong decrease (-43%) ↑ 
EU sugar imports from low-cost 
countries Marginal decrease (-4%) ↑ 
EU sugar exports Decrease  (-15%) ↓ → reversal 
EU consumption of sugar Marginal increase (< 1%) ↓ → reversal 
EU sugar price (relative to the in-
quota price) Significant decline (-15-16%) ↑ 
EU welfare Marginal increase (< 0.1%) ↑ 
EU beet sector  income2 Strong decline (-17%) ↑ 
1.  For the interpretation of the symbols in this column, see the text below. 
2. Impact on individual beet growers’ total income is smaller as even the most specialised enterprises grow 
sugar beet no more than 30% of their agricultural areas. 
  
Isoglucose quotas will expire along with sugar quotas, and there is much speculation about the 
extent of potential competitive substitution between the two sweeteners, which has until now been 
constrained by the quota arrangements. Sensitivity analysis was performed to obtain greater 
insight into this issue. Two additional quota-expiry scenarios were run, in which isoglucose was 
assumed to take a 10% and a 20% share of the sweetener market at the expense of sugar, 
compared to less than 5% in the standard scenario.  
The third column of the above table describes how an increasing share of isoglucose in the 
sweetener market modifies the result of the standard no-quota scenario. A downward arrow 
means that the impact in the standard scenario is reduced while keeping its sign, whereas an 
upward arrow signifies that the impact is enhanced while its sign is maintained. A downward arrow 
followed by ‘→ reversal’ means that the impact is reduced in magnitude to such an extent that, by 
the time a 20% market share for isoglucose is reached – or before – the sign of the impact is 
reversed. 
In addition, the report presents simulated impacts at Member State, and sub-Member State, 
levels. The main findings in the standard no-quota scenario are: 
• impacts at Member State level are not uniform; all Member States except Greece and the 
Netherlands increase sugar beet production, although beet revenue per hectare falls in all 
Member States except Romania, where it is unchanged, 
• the size of the revenue fall (in absolute magnitude) is inversely related to the extent to which 
total sugar production (including sugar for industrial use) exceeds the sugar quota in the with-
quota scenario, 
• the average fall in revenue per hectare across EU27 is -5.8%, 
• at NUTS2 level, impacts on production and income vary considerably across the EU and within 
some of the larger Member States. Moreover some regions with strong production increases 
nevertheless experience substantial income declines. 
The consequences at Member State and sub-Member State level become more negative as an 
increasing market share for isoglucose is assumed. 
Plausibility of the results, in particular regarding the regional distribution of isoglucose production 
and demand, would be enhanced if CAPRI were extended by adding an empirically supported 
depiction of the isoglucose sector and its interactions with the EU sugar market.  
The study does not quantify the impacts on third countries in terms of welfare changes or changes 
in export revenues. When interpreting the very small welfare increases calculated for the EU, it 
should be borne in mind that other non-reported negative welfare changes are triggered outside 
the EU, and that these changes might fall quite heavily on particular third countries or economic 
groups (producers and refiners) whereas consumers are likely to gain.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This report presents the results of a study comparing the outcomes of two alternative policy 
regimes in the European Union composed of 27 Member States (EU27) in the year 2020. The 
policy change examined involves the presence or absence of quota limits on the domestic market 
supply of sugar for human consumption. Information available to the authors up to the end of 
2012 was included in this study, as this was the end date of the scenario analyses and editing of 
the report. 
Quota limits on sugar production, defined at Member State level and further allocated over 
processing factories and individual sugar beet growers, have been in place for decades. In 2006, a 
reform of the CAP sugar regime brought a simplification of the quota structure, and incentives 
were offered to Member States that opted to reduce – or renounce altogether – their national 
quota limits. Quotas were prolonged until 2014/15, with no commitment to further renewal. In line 
with the dairy sector, where the renewal of milk quotas up to 2014/15 was subsequently formally 
converted to a decision terminating the milk quota regime in that year, the understanding is that 
2014/15 will also mark the end of sugar quotas in the EU. This means, among other things, that 
market segmentation (between the markets for quota sugar, non-quota sugar and other products 
derived from sugar beet) will end, and a single set of prices for sugar beet and processed sugar 
will operate, regardless of their end use. Furthermore, it is expected that Member States with 
comparative advantage in sugar production will be able to expand their production levels when this 
looks profitable according to market signals, whereas in other Member States, where less efficient 
sugar production has been shielded from market forces by the quota system or where there is 
competition for land from other high-value crops, the sugar sector will be streamlined.  
Alongside these likely impacts on beet production at Member State level, there are also concerns 
about implications for regions within Member States, for EU external trade and specific third-
country imports, and for other related markets. It is this broader set of implications that justify a 
study such as the one presented here. The present study simulates the two policy regimes (quota 
expiry and extension of quotas for an unspecified period) in the year 2020 using a model that 
represents all agricultural activities and the biofuel sector, and with worldwide coverage. These 
results permit the differences in outcomes for the various stakeholders of the sugar supply chain, 
other primary producers and the size of the resulting welfare transfers to be quantified.  
The model used for the study (CAPRI) is capable of following these changes through to sub-
Member State (NUTS2) level. Although most of the results reported here do not go beyond the 
level of the Member States, some selected results (impacts on beet production and agricultural 
income) are presented at NUTS2 level.  
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2 THE CONTEXT: PRODUCTION, POLICIES AND MARKETS 
2.1 Sugar Production in the EU 
Sugar is produced in the majority of Member States. The raw materials are sugar beet, plus a 
small quantity of sugar cane grown in three of the French overseas departments. Sugar beet yields 
vary considerably, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Sugar beet yields1 by Member State, tons/hectare, average 2009-11. 
 
Source: Eurostat.  
1. Data for sugar beet production divided by sugar beet area. The figure for EU27 is for 2011 only. 
Member States can be grouped into three broad categories: France, Belgium, Spain, the 
Netherlands and Austria had average yields in 2009-11 in excess of the EU27 mean of 71 tons per 
hectare. In 2011, these five Member States produced 47.5% of EU sugar beet output, on 38.0% of 
EU sugar beet area. A second group, consisting of Germany, UK, Greece, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Sweden, Slovakia, Italy and Hungary registered average yields for 2009-11 between 55 
and 65 tons per hectare, whereas the remaining Member States —Poland, Lithuania, Finland, 
Romania and Portugal (the Azores)— had yields below 52 tons per hectare. Overall, yields vary by 
a factor of more than 2 between the lowest- and highest-performing Member States. There is also 
considerable variation between Member States in the average sugar content of the beet grown1.  
Average production costs also vary considerably across Member States. Agrosynergie (2011, p.83) 
provides 2006-2008 figures on intermediate consumption (derived from FADN for selected Member 
States) that range from 44 €/ha in Poland to 310 €/ha in Germany. For the same period, the range 
in average net farm income for sugar beet farming systems was even wider, from €158/ha (Italy) 
                                                 
1  For example, for 2007-9, sugar yield (t/ha) was 12.4 and 12.0 t/ha in the Netherlands and Spain, 
respectively, and 8.2 and 5.7 t/ha in Poland and Finland, respectively (Agrosynergie, 2011, Table 19). 
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to €659/ha (Germany) when decoupled direct farm payments are included, and between -€81/ha 
(Italy) and €448/ha (Poland) when decoupled payments are not included.  
In 2012, the total area of beet production was 1,619,674 ha in EU272. About 80% of the EU27 
area is in EU15. Beet was grown and beet sugar is produced in 12 Member States of EU15 (plus 
the Azores), but in only 6 of the 12 new Member States. The volume of sugar beet produced was 
113,956,501 tons. 
In 2011, the number of holdings growing sugar beet in EU27 was 155,381, with nearly three-
quarters of them in EU153. Total sugar production (including white sugar as such and sugar 
processed into other food and non-food products, as well as sugar extracted from molasses) was 
14,968,186 tons in EU27.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of beet production, isoglucose production, cane sugar refining and 
beet ethanol production activities across Member States. Since raw sugar beet is bulky and difficult 
to transport, beet processing factories are located in beet growing areas. Absence of beet 
production in a Member State therefore implies zero production of beet sugar.  
Seven Member States (five of them in EU12) have no national sweetener production at all. 
Bulgaria and mainland Portugal no longer produce beet sugar, but have some isoglucose 
production, as well as several cane sugar refineries (5 in Bulgaria, 3 in Portugal) (CEFS, 2011). 
The only other cane sugar refineries in the EU in 2010 were in Romania (5), and one each in 
southern Italy, southern France, the UK, Sweden and Finland. In addition, combined beet and cane 
sugar refineries are found in Romania (3), the UK (2) and Spain (1) (CEFS, 2011). The EU sugar 
industry is currently dominated by five EU multinationals. 
Table 1. Production of beet and beet sugar, cane sugar, isoglucose and beet 
ethanol in Member States. 
Member States having 
NO sugar beet or beet 
sugar production 
Member States 
producing isoglucose 
Member States with 
cane sugar refining 
Member States with 
beet ethanol production
 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Portugal (continental), 
Slovenia 
 
Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain 
Cane sugar refinery/ 
refineries:  
Bulgaria, Finland, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania, 
Sweden, UK 
Combined beet and cane 
sugar refinery/refineries: 
Romania, Spain, UK 
 
Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, 
Poland, UK 
Source: CEFS (2011). 
There has been very substantial restructuring in the sugar beet processing sector since 2005, due 
both to the pursuit of economies of scale and to the 24% decline in the volume of production 
quota. The number of sugar factories fell from 179 to 106 between 2005/6 and 2009/10, with 22 
of these closures occurring in Poland alone and another 15 in Italy. Countries exiting from 
production (Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, Slovenia and mainland Portugal) were responsible for a 
further 7 factory closures. In 2009/10, 42% of the factories remaining in production were in 
metropolitan France and Germany (Agrosynergie, 2011).  
                                                 
2 Figures in this paragraph relate to 2012, and are provided by Eurostat. 
3 Figures in this paragraph are taken from CEFS (2011). 
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Over the same period the isoglucose sector has also been substantially restructured. Before the 
reform, there were seven isoglucose companies operating factories at 20 sites in 15 Member 
States. By 2010, the number of companies had been reduced to six, with the number of factories 
and Member States involved having fallen to 11 and 9, respectively (Agrosynergie, 2011).  
2.2 Sugar policy in the CAP 
The EU’s common market organisation for sugar, set up in 1968, remained largely unchanged until 
2006. It was characterised by a system of supply quotas, which were defined by EU legislation for 
each Member State. Member States could then allocate quota to factories, as well as ‘delivery 
rights’ to individual growers specifying the amount of ‘quota beet’ (i.e. beet to be processed into 
‘quota sugar’ attracting a high support price) they could deliver. The arrangements for transferring 
quota (owned by factories) and delivery rights (issued to growers) within national boundaries were 
a matter of national competence. 
Total quota was subdivided into A- and B-quota (roughly four-fifths and one-fifth of total quota, 
respectively), with beet grown for B-sugar qualifying for a lower support price. Out-of-quota (‘C’) 
sugar could be exported but without an export refund, or carried over to the following year. When 
carried over, C-sugar was treated as A-sugar the following year, and the amount carried over 
could not be more than 20% of a Member State’s total A quota allocation. Sugar produced for 
certain industrial uses was outside the sugar regime; it attracted no support and could be 
produced in unlimited quantities.  
Since 1977, the production of isoglucose (in the EU, exclusively HFS-424) for supply onto the EU 
market has also been subject to quota under CAP sugar sector regulations. From 1994 onwards, 
inulin syrup was also included within the sugar regime and subject to supply quotas5. 
In 2006, the common market organisation for sugar underwent significant reform in order to align 
it more closely with the principles of the 2003 CAP reform. The 2003 reform involved the main 
arable and livestock products, for which some market price support was replaced by a non-
commodity-specific decoupled direct producer payment accompanied by a reduced level of market 
intervention. Although the 2006 reform of the sugar regime was part of the longer-term agenda of 
sector-by-sector reform of the CAP, it became urgent following the WTO panel’s judgement in 
2005 that the EU’s C-sugar exports could not qualify as unsubsidised. According to the ruling, 
these exports were ‘cross-subsidised’ by the high prices for sugar for internal use, which fully 
covered the factories’ fixed costs, meaning that C-sugar could be sold profitably on the world 
market as long as the world market price met the relatively low marginal production cost.  
Table 2 summarises the changes introduced by the 2006 reform, which were fully in place by 2010 
after a 4-year transition period. The main changes are the merging of A- and B-quota, the 
winding-up of public intervention storage (replaced by several much lighter, discretionary safety-
net measures) and the (WTO-imposed) limits on out-of-quota sugar exports. 
 
                                                 
4 ‘HFS’=High Fructose Syrup. In the US, where the raw energy ingredient is corn (maize), it is known as High 
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS). In Europe, the raw materials are wheat, maize or potato starch. Of the three 
common formulations of isoglucose (HFS42, HFS55 and HFS90, where the number refers to the percentage of 
fructose and the remainder consists largely of glucose), only HFS42 is produced in the EU (Dillen et al., 2006). 
5 In Europe, inulin syrup is processed from the root vegetable chicory. 
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Table 2. Policy developments and definition of policy context for the simulations. 
 Before 2006 [Reg (EC) 1260/2001] 2006 reform [Reg (EC) 318/2006] Situation in 2010 NO QUOTA EXTENSION  
   transition measures complete + 
amending regulations1 
market shares of sugar & isoglucose 
(1) unchanged (2) changed  
Quotas 
A and B quotas defined and 
allocated to MS for sugar, 
isoglucose and inulin syrup 
•A and B quotas merged 
•Incentives for Member States to renounce 
quota in exchange for temporary restructuring 
aid2  
EU27 sugar quota : 13,336,741 t  
EU27 isoglucose quota : 690,441 t  
Inulin quotas renounced as from 2007 
No quantitative supply restrictions 
on beet growing, sugar production 
and isoglucose production  
Intervention In place, but rarely used Continues until end-2009/10 (at 80% of 
reference price) No intervention No intervention 
Institutional 
prices Intervention prices: White sugar: €631.9/t 
Raw sugar: €523.7/t 
Reference price change over the transition 
period:  
White sugar: -36% 
Raw sugar: -32.5% 
Reference prices: 
Quota white sugar : €404.4/t 
Quota raw sugar: €335.2/t 
Reference price for optional PSA: 
White sugar: €404.4/t  
Prices are determined by the model, 
according to supply and demand 
Minimum 
beet prices 
A beet: €46.72/t 
B beet: €32.42/t  Change during transition period:  Quota beet: -20% 
Target price:  
Quota beet: €26.29/t 
Abolished, beet price is determined 
by the model, according to supply 
and demand 
Exports Refunds paid on quota sugar up to 
WTO bindings 
Out-of-quota ( C) sugar exported 
without refund  
(WTO ruling) Subsidised sugar exports ≤ 1.374 
million t; out-of-quota sugar exports in excess 
of this only if the EU can prove that they are 
not cross-subsidised. 
•Out-of-quota export limit of 1.35 
million t white sugar, 50 K t of 
isoglucose.  
•Export refunds on unprocessed sugar 
and sugar syrups suspended in 20084 
Export limit of 1.35 million t white 
sugar no longer in place, no export 
refunds 
Imports 
MFN tariffs 
 
Preferential 
agreements 
 
White sugar: €419/t 
Raw sugar:€339/t 
EBA and ACP 
Bilateral agreements 
•Tariff rates maintained 
•EBA, EPA and bilateral agreements extended 
•Duty-free imports of sugar and isoglucose for 
industrial use up to quota ceiling  
•New multilateral quota of 528.38K t (in-quota 
tariff of €98/t). 
•Tariff rates maintained 
•Preferential agreements maintained5 
•Quota for industrial imports in 2010 
was 400K t (not modelled here, since it 
changes from year to year) 
•Multilateral quota of 253.98 K t. 
 
Tariff rates maintained 
 
No change 
Other 
arrangements 
 Transitional Community aid to processors and 
beet growers, plus possible State Aid for the 
latter. 
Private storage aid to manufacturers triggered 
by very low prices .  
Market withdrawals at the discretion of the 
Commission, no storage aid on withdrawn 
sugar. 
 
Measures maintained 
 
No change 
1. Including Reg (EC) 1234/2007, Reg (EC) 828/2009, Reg (EC) 513/2010.  2.  Reg (EC) 320/2006.  3. Net change in quota since 2006: sugar: EU25: -24.2%, 
EU27 : -24.1%; isoglucose : EU25: +18.2%, EU27: +15.5%.  4. Regs (EC) 947/2008 and 948/2008.  5. Unlimited duty-free access for EPA countries from 2015 
onwards. 
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Sugar quota totalling 17,549,701 t was allocated for 2006/7 to the 21 sugar-producing Member 
States (four of the 25 Member States - Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta - did not produce 
sugar). Bulgaria and Romania also received quota when they entered the EU in 2007. As part of 
the 2006 reform (Regs (EC) 318/2006 and EC 320/2006), Member States of EU25 had to achieve a 
reduction of 6 million tons of sugar quota by the end of the transition period, preferably by 
voluntary renunciation of part or all of the quota allocated to them for 2006/7. Temporary 
restructuring aid was available to assist this process (Reg (EC) 320/2006). By 2010/11, only 19 out 
of 27 Member States were still producing sugar. Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, and Slovenia had ceased 
production, as had continental (mainland) Portugal. All other Member States made partial 
reductions to their quota holdings. After allowing for these quota renunciations and some additional 
quota to specific Member States, the total quota allocation for EU27 for 2010/11 and subsequent 
years was 13,336,741 t. 
All the policy measures in place in 2010/11 (third column of Table 2) are represented when 
simulating the impacts of extending quotas to 2020 in our study, whereas in the different versions 
of the quota-expiry scenario, the only policy changes are the cessation of quota and the freeing of 
the price mechanism (fourth column of Table 2). All other policies (trade policies, safety net, etc) 
remain unchanged. In particular, once quotas are dismantled, there is just one category of sugar 
available to the market, and only one producer price for beet. Prices are fully market determined, 
but still within the constraints imposed by the border measures in force. 
Table 3 shows that following the 2006 reform all Member States reduced their quota holdings, 
although the net rate of reduction varied greatly, with a few Member States renouncing their entire 
quota allocation. As a result, production became more concentrated geographically than it had 
been prior to the reform. In particular, in 2010/11, 47.5% of EU27 sugar quota was held by France 
(including its overseas departments) and Germany, as opposed to 41% in 2006. These two 
Member States produced about 73% of the EU’s out-of-quota sugar equivalent in 2010/11 (which, 
as before the reform, had to be used for export up to a binding limit, domestic industrial use or 
carry-over stocking).  
Thirteen Member States were allocated isoglucose production quotas for 2006/7, as were Bulgaria 
and Romania one year later. In 2010/11,only 9 of the 27 MS still had isoglucose quota. In fact, the 
trend towards concentration in isoglucose production between 2006/7 and 2010/2011 was more 
marked than for sugar production. In 2010/11, Hungary alone was holding about one-third of total 
isoglucose quota, and Belgium about one-sixth. Only four Member States produced out-of-quota 
isoglucose in 2010/11, and about 88% of the total out-of-quota isoglucose was produced in 
Hungary, which supplied 19% more than its national quota.  
The increase in the total amount of isoglucose quota allocated to Member States that occurred 
between 2006/7 and 2010/11, despite significant isoglucose quota renunciation, is explained by 
the fact that extra quota totalling 300 thousand tons was released to some Member States during 
the transition period. This was intended as compensation for potential loss of competitiveness 
against sugar since the (policy-induced) fall in beet prices was not accompanied by a fall in starch 
prices in these countries.  
Regulation (EC) 318/2006 also allocates 320,718 tonnes of production quota for inulin syrup to 
three Member States (Belgium: 215,247 t, France: 24,521 t, Netherlands: 80,950 t). This quota 
was given up by the Member States concerned, and from 2007/8 onwards, the amounts allocated 
under these quotas have been zero. 
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Table 3. Production quotas, sugar and isoglucose, 2006/7 and 2011/12.  
 SUGAR ISOGLUCOSE 
Production quota Net change% % of total
% over 
national 
quota 
% of EU's 
over-
quota 
sugar 
Production within quota 
Net 
change 
% 
% over 
national 
quota Member State 
2006/7 2010/11 2006/7-2010/11 2010/11 2006/7 2010/11 
2006/7-
2010/11 2010/11 
AUT 387,326 351,027 -9.4 2.6 26.5 3.4     
BE 819,812 676,235 -17.5 5.1 11.7 2.9 71,592 114,580 60.0 0.0 
BLG  0 -100.0†     89,198 0.0† 0.0 
CZE 454,862 372,459 -18.1 2.8 24.3 3.3     
DK 420,746 372,383 -11.5 2.8 23.2 3.2     
FI 146,087 80,999 -44.6 0.6 1.5 0.0 11,872 0 -100.0  
FR (met.) 3,288,747 3,004,811 -8.6 22.5 41.0 45.2 19,846 0 -100.0  
FR (o’seas) 480,245 432,220 -10.0 3.2 0.0 0.0     
DE 3,416,896 2,898,256 -15.2 21.7 26.1 27.7 35,389 56,638 60.0 6.4 
GR 317,502 158,702 -50.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 12,893 0 -100.0  
HU 401,684 105,420 -73.8 0.8 14.3 0.6 137,627 220,266 60.0 19.3 
IRE 199,260 0 -100.0        
IT 1,557,443 508,379 -67.4 3.8 2.6 0.5 20,302 32,493 -76.4 0.0 
LAT 66,505 0 -100.0        
LIT 103,010 90,252 -12.4 0.7 2.4 0.1     
NL 864,560 804,888 -6.9 6.0 11.0 3.2 9,099 0 -100.0  
PL 1,671,926 1,405,608 -15.9 10.5 4.3 2.2 26,781 42,861 60.0 0.0 
PT(cont.) 69,718 0  -100.0    9,917 11,261 13.6 0.0 
PT(Azores) 9,953 9,953 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0     
RO  104,689 -4.1† 0.8 24.1 0.9   -100.0†  
SLK 207,432 112,320 -45.9 0.8 25.2 1.0 42,547 68,095 60.0 1.2 
SLN 52,973 0 -100.0        
SP 996,961 498,480 -50.0 3.7 6.5 1.2 82,579 53,810 -34.8 2.1 
SWE 368,262 293,186 -20.4 2.2 13.2 1.4     
UK 1,138,627 1,056,474 -7.2 7.9 8.0 3.1 27,237 0 -100.0  
EU-27 17,549,701 13,336,741 -24.0 100.0 20.4 100.0 507,681 689,202 35.8 35.8 
Source: Reg 318/2006 (Annex III), DG AGRI. 
†  Bulgaria and Romania received 4,752 t and 109,164 t of sugar quota, respectively, and 89,158 t and 
13,193 t of isoglucose quota, respectively, on entering in 2007. Changes for these MS are shown with 
respect to these initial values.  
2.3 The sugar market 
Beet sugar counts for less than one-quarter (22% in 2009/10) of total world sugar production, 
having declined from over one-third in the mid-1990s. In 2010, the EU produced 66% of the 
world’s sugar beet crop, but just 5.6 thousand tons of the world’s 1.69 billion tons of sugar cane 
output (FAOSTAT). Much of the world market sugar trade is in raw sugar, whereas EU exports 
consist for the most part of refined sugar. 
World sugar exports have increased sharply in recent years. In 2009, 51 million tons of sugar 
(measured in raw sugar equivalent) were exported, compared with 38 million tons in 2000. Over 
the same period, the percentage of world production traded on the world market rose from 29% to 
33%, while the share of global exports originating in Brazil – the world’s lowest-cost producer - 
rose from 18% to 49% (FAOSTAT). By contrast, EU exports have fallen sharply: the share of EU15 
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in world sugar exports was 25% in 2000, but by 2009 that of EU27 was only 14% (FAOSTAT). As a 
consequence of the 2006 reform and the subsequent reductions in sugar production, the EU went 
from being a net exporter (with net exports of around 3 million tons in 2005 and 2006) to being a 
net importer (1.1 million tons in 2007, 1.6 million tons in 2009) (FAOSTAT). 
The EU is traditionally a significant importer of sugar under various preferential trade agreements, 
notably from ACP countries under the long-standing EU-ACP Sugar Protocol. Starting in 2001, 50 of 
the world’s poorest countries (LDCs) have had duty-free access to the EU sugar market up to a 
quota limit under the EBA agreement6, which was removed in 2009 giving them unlimited duty-free 
access. The Sugar Protocol was ended by the EU in 2007. In its stead, ACP countries that were not 
in the EBA category were included in the EPA7 regime, which grants more general duty-free access 
to the EU market together with reciprocal liberalisation of market access for EU exports. Within the 
EPA regime, there is a transition period for sugar, which is scheduled to end in 2015. Bilateral TRQs 
with four sugar-exporting countries, and one multilateral TRQ open to all countries, were awarded 
at the time of the 1995 enlargement and increased when Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, to 
compensate sugar exporters for potential market loss8. In addition, bilateral TRQs are allocated to 
five Balkan countries9.  
The value of the EU’s preferential trade agreements to exporting countries depends crucially on the 
difference between the internal EU price and the world market price (the ‘preference margin’). As a 
result of the 2006 reform and the 36% fall in the reference price of sugar, this margin has been 
eroded, although the EU market still remains very attractive for third-country exporters with 
preferential access. Given these trading arrangements, the effects of quota removal in 2015 on EU 
domestic production and prices could impact on import flows and possibly on the world sugar 
market as a whole, as well as on the welfare of exporting countries that depend heavily on the 
current 'preference margin' for sugar export revenue.  
EU sugar production may also face additional competition on the domestic market from isoglucose 
if quotas on both products are removed. Currently, the market share of isoglucose is thought to be 
about 5% of the total EU sweetener market. This market share largely reflects the relative size of 
the production quotas for the two products and various trade restrictions, rather than technical 
constraints and consumer preferences. There is much speculation about how market shares might 
change when quotas for both products are removed.  
In the US, which is the world’s largest producer and consumer of HFCS (isoglucose from maize), 
HFCS consumption more than trebled between 1980 and 2002, attaining a market share of about 
43% of the total US (caloric) sweetener market (USDA, 2012). However, between 2002 and 2011, 
HFCS consumption fell by 22%, and its market share (in a shrinking total sweetener market) fell by 
nearly 19% to 36%10.  
                                                 
6 Everything But Arms. 
7 European Partnership Agreements. 
8 The in-quota tariff for these TRQs is €98/t, except for the small TRQ for India, which has a zero rate.  
9 For more details, see Reg (EC) 891/2009. 
10 The category ‘corn sweeteners’ in the US market also includes glucose syrup and dextrose, which were 
already consumed to some extent before the upsurge of HFCS in manufactured foods, which started in the late 
1960s. The share of this total category in the US sweetener market peaked in 2003 at 56% and in 2012 had 
fallen to 47.6%. The decline in maize-based sweeteners reflects their deteriorating image, which is thought to 
be due in large part to increasing public awareness about food quality, a growing preference for more ‘natural’ 
ingredients, and stimulated by alleged links between HFCS and obesity (see Mercer, 2010).  
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The potential EU market share for isoglucose after quota abolition is probably much smaller than 
the current US share. At the start of the decade, total sugar consumption in the EU was divided in 
the ratio 70:30 between processed food and drinks and direct final consumption in the form of 
sugar (Blume, 2002), and we assume that these proportions are more or less unchanged. 
Isoglucose is not a substitute for pure sugar in direct consumption, but can substitute for sugar to 
varying degrees in the manufacturing of baked goods, confectionary, icecream and so on. In the 
soft drinks industry, its substitutability for sugar is high. However, per capita soft drink 
consumption in the EU is far lower than that in the US.  
On the cost side, it was widely believed that production costs of isoglucose in the EU are 
considerably lower than those of sugar, although much higher than those of US HFCS (because of 
smaller plant sizes in the EU, more costly raw materials and the effect of being under quota). NEI 
(2000, Table 6.10) quotes prices for the period 1994-98 showing that average production costs for 
EU sugar were about 60% higher than those of EU isoglucose, whilst isoglucose production cost 
was about 33% higher in the EU than in the US. In the EU, isoglucose prices are set in relation to 
those of sugar.  
According to Dillen et al. (2006), the price of isoglucose has to be 10% lower than that of sugar for 
it to be competitive with sugar (due to higher transport and storage costs, and lower sweetening 
power). These authors argue that the expected steep decrease in the sugar price as a consequence 
of the 2006 sugar reform, which isoglucose producers have to match, would lead to a 42-44% 
decline in the gross margin for isoglucose (including the value of by-products, and depending on 
the crop source of the starch) by the end of the transition period. This is because the cost of the 
raw material will not decline in line with the beet price and the extra isoglucose quota granted as 
compensation is too small to deliver economies of scale.  
These authors conclude that a consequence of the 2006 reform will be to make the EU sweetener 
market less competitive. The potential worsening of the competitive position of isoglucose after the 
reform helps to explain the sharp concentration in isoglucose production in recent years, as 
producers have chosen between undertaking large increases in scale or abandoning production. It 
also suggests that the movement in market shares of sugar and isoglucose after quota abolition 
will depend quite strongly on its impact, if any, on EU sugar prices and the potential to benefit from 
further economies of scale for isoglucose production. 
Finally, a survey of UK food manufacturers conducted in 2004 (Leatherhead Food International, 
2004) found that consumer preferences and loyalties (with respect to the ‘product recipe’, which 
determines the taste and consistency of the product as perceived by consumers) were very 
important for determining the scope for food processors to substitute between sugar and other 
sweeteners in response to policy and market changes. In addition, technical reasons (more so for 
low-volume sugar users) and relative prices (more so for high-volume sugar users) were 
considered important for determining substitution rates. This heterogeneity increases caution about 
using a rule-of-thumb assumption about the impact of abolition on market shares for sugar and 
isoglucose.  
Because of this uncertainty and in the absence of an in-depth analysis of the isoglucose market in 
this study, a sensitivity analysis is performed to gauge the consequences for the sugar sector of 
different assumptions about the relative market shares of these two sweeteners after quota 
abolition. In particular, two versions of the no-quota scenario assume that the isoglucose share of 
the EU sweetener market increases to 10% and 20%, respectively. 
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3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This section provides a conceptual analysis of the impact of sugar quotas and their abolition on 
EU production and markets. A simple theoretical static, partial equilibrium model is used and 
the results are shown graphically. It predicts the main expected impacts of sugar quota expiry 
on regional production, EU aggregate production, prices and trade.  
Our approach assumes complete market adjustment of prices and quantities. In addition, it 
makes several assumptions that are customarily made in economic analysis but which, in this 
case, have some bearing on the results. First, uncertainty and risk faced by producers are not 
taken into account in the framework used. The implications of this simplification for the 
analysis of reactions at regional level are discussed below. Second, it assumes that ‘sugar’ is a 
homogeneous good. As explained several paragraphs below, all quantities are expressed in 
‘white sugar equivalents’, even when representing the market for sugar beet. When a good is 
homogeneous, basic economic theory would predict that, in the absence of relevant policy-
induced constraints, a country will either import it or export it, depending on import and export 
prices relative to the domestic price at the margin, but not do both. Therefore, trade flows in 
both directions are not envisaged by basic economic theory as used in our analysis. The 
implications of this for our analysis of the sugar market are also discussed later in this section. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the sugar processing industry is not depicted in this 
representation, but this omission should not invalidate the general results.  
The formal model is presented in Figure 2 (page 14). It consists of four segments. It should be 
noted that in each of the four panels, ‘sugar’ is defined and measured in ‘white sugar 
equivalents’, with the axes scaled accordingly, although in reality the commodity actually 
traded is sugar beet in panel 1 and raw sugar in panel 4.  
To allow for regional heterogeneity, the EU is treated as consisting of two regions, region 1 and 
region 2. For simplicity, the two regions are assumed to have the same quota allocations but 
different levels of productivity. Region 1 is assumed to have lower productivity potential. Its 
sugar beet supply is represented by the upward-sloping curve S1 in the first panel of Figure 2. 
In contrast, region 2 is assumed to have greater sugar productivity potential and its sugar beet 
supply is given by curve S2. When quotas are in force, beet produced in region 1 is profitable 
only at the in-quota price whereas in region 2 some out-of-quota beet is profitable at the 
margin. Although it is an extreme simplification to assume just two regions, they represent the 
two typical cases that must be distinguished in order to understand the impact of quota 
removal. Starting from this simple model, a multi-regional model could be generated such that 
the main conclusions from the two-region model still hold.  
3.1 Situation with quotas in force 
Beginning with Scenario 1 (quotas in force), the regional quotas (Q1 and Q2 for region 1 and 
region 2, respectively) are represented by the thick vertical line in the first panel of Figure 2. It 
can be seen in panel 1 that region 1 does not fill its quota (production is YQ1 < Q1) whereas 
region 2 produces out-of-quota sugar (in the amount YQ2-Q2). It is important to bear in mind, 
when interpreting the figure, that the units in the first panel refer to price per unit of beet and 
quantity of beet, respectively. They have been scaled such that they correspond to the 
quantity of beet required to produce one ton of white sugar, and the price for that quantity of 
beet. The other three panels represent markets where sugar is traded, and refer to white sugar 
or white sugar equivalent (when in fact the commodity might be raw sugar).  
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The second panel in Figure 2 shows the EU sugar market. Aggregate EU sugar supply is given 
by curve S1, which is the horizontal summation of regional supplies YQ1 and S2. Given the price 
PEU1, the supply from region 1 is unresponsive to changes in the world market prices, and 
hence the slope of this supply curve depends only on the price responsiveness of out-of-quota 
sugar supplied by region 2. 
The aggregate EU sugar demand is shown as DT, which is the sum of food sugar demand, DF, 
and industrial (including bioethanol) sugar demand, DI (= DT - DF) as shown in the third panel. 
However, as explained below, this aggregate demand is not expressed in any single market as 
long as quotas are in force, since the quota regime effectively creates two separate markets 
for these two components of aggregate demand. Only in the post-quota scenario is the total 
demand given by DT expressed in a single consolidated market. The amount of sugar sold for 
food is given by YF1. This is composed of YQ, which is the total amount of quota sugar produced 
in the two regions (YQ1 + YQ2), and imported sugar (YF1 - YQ), which is shown as YM1 in the 
fourth panel. Total imports can be broken down into the imports under (bilateral and 
multilateral) TRQs, which for the most part come from low-cost producers and with an in-quota 
tariff rate of €9811, and imports from EPA and EBA countries, which – by 2020 – will all be duty 
free and quota free (see Section 2.3). The quantity of this duty-free sugar is shown as YEPA1 in 
the fourth panel. 
The third panel in Figure 2 illustrates the EU out-of-quota sugar market (including industrial 
sugar and exports), where DI represents industrial sugar demand. The out-of-quota supply is 
given by an upward-sloping curve and is calculated as the horizontal difference between the 
aggregate sugar supply, S1, and the production of quota sugar, YQ.  
This panel shows how out-of-quota sugar, whose sale within the EU does not benefit from the 
supported price of in-quota sugar, is allocated between the internal industrial sugar market 
(IQC) and the world market (IQP - IQC). The graph presented here assumes that all the out-of-
quota sugar produced can either be sold for industrial use in the EU, or exported, at the world 
market price (the thick horizontal lines representing out-of-quota sugar in the first three 
panels are equal). In practice, as long as sugar quotas are in force, there is a limit on exports 
of 1,375 tons. It is assumed that a uniform price is received for beet whether it goes for 
industrial use or export. Should out-of-quota production in any given year be such that, once 
industrial demand is satisfied, the remainder exceeds this export limit, it is likely to be held as 
carry-over stock rather than being allowed to depress the price for industrial sugar below the 
world market price. Hence, it is assumed that both sugar for industrial use and for export 
receive the world market price, PW.  
Figure 2 and the above discussion assume that the world market price for sugar is higher than 
both the minimum price for beet in sugar equivalents and the reference price for sugar12 on the 
respective internal markets. These prices are denoted heuristically as PQ in Figure 2. Below this 
price, withdrawal measures as foreseen in Regulation (EC) 1234/2007 may be used. This latter 
possibility is not described in the figure and is not considered in the analysis.  
                                                 
11 India, which has a TRQ of 10 thousand tons, is the exception. 
12 Reg 1234/2007, Article 49, fixes the minimum price that processors must pay producers for beet to be 
processed into quota sugar at €26.29/t, and the reference price for white sugar at €404.4/t. When the average 
white sugar price approaches the reference price, a percentage, common to all Member States, of quota sugar, 
quota isoglucose and quota inulin syrup may be withdrawn from the market, to be stored by processors at their 
own expense until the beginning of the following marketing year, so as to prevent the EU price falling below 
this level.  
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The fourth panel shows the market from which the EU imports sugar. Given the very high MFN 
tariffs on sugar imports (see Table 2, first column), the market for sugar imports available to 
the EU is restricted to sugar that can be supplied under some kind of preferential arrangement 
(bilateral and multilateral TRQs, and the duty-free quota-free concession to EPA and EBA 
countries that will be fully in operation from 2015 onwards). For the suppliers of this sugar, the 
EU is the preferred buyer due to the high preference margin. In fact, many of these exporting 
countries are high-cost producers that are not competitive at world market prices. It follows 
that, from the EU perspective, this market is segmented from the ‘open’ world sugar market.  
The EU’s demand function is the excess demand at each price, given the EU policy regime and 
internal price. The EU faces an upward-sloping supply curve for imported sugar, which is 
composed of sugar supplied by EPA/EBA countries and sugar supplied under bilateral and 
multilateral TRQs. When EU prices are high, the slope of this supply curve is determined by the 
slopes of the supply schedules of EPA/EBA countries, since much of the sugar supplied under 
both bilateral and multilateral TRQs comes from low-cost producers (most notably Brazil) who 
can be expected to fill their TRQs when EU prices are high. However, should the EU price fall 
below the world market price plus the in-quota tariff, the EU market becomes unattractive to 
these exporters, their TRQs will not be filled and the aggregate import supply function becomes 
more elastic. 
Among the countries that supply imports under a TRQ, it is useful to distinguish between countries 
whose production and marketing costs are less than the world market prices (‘competitive at world 
market price’), and those for which the cost of producing and delivering to the world market are 
greater than the world market price ('not competitive at world market price’). The behaviour of 
these two categories of country with respect to TRQ rates is differentiated in Table 4. 
Table 4. Conditions determining TRQ fill rates13.  
 EU price relative to the world market price 
PEU > PW + in-quota tariff PEU < PW + in-quota tariff Countries whose 
export supply is: 
  
Competitive at the 
world market price 
TRQ with the EU is filled Exports switch from the EU market to 
the world market  
Not competitive at the 
world market price 
TRQ with the EU is filled if  
PEU - in-quota tariff > costs of 
production and transport 
Not exported  
Countries that are able to take advantage of a TRQ and that are competitive at the world market 
price will fill their TRQ allocation as long as the EU price less the in-quota tariff is higher than the 
world market price. When the price gap between the EU price and the world market price becomes 
smaller than the in-quota tariff (currently €98/t), the world market is more attractive than the EU 
market and these countries’ TRQ will not be filled. For this group of countries, it is the level of the 
EU price relative to the world market price that matters.  
                                                 
13 This table can also be adapted to apply countries with unlimited duty-free access. Setting the in-quota tariff 
equal to zero, and replacing the outcome ‘TRQ filled’ with an alternative supply limit, namely  the quantity at 
which - for each level of price – the marginal production + delivery cost equals the EU price. For the highest-
cost countries, the volume exported to the EU (or elsewhere) will become zero before the EU price falls as low 
as the world market price; for lower-cost countries, when the EU price falls to the world market price, they are 
indifferent between supplying to the EU or the world markets. 
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Countries with TRQ access that are not competitive at the world market price (and assuming they 
have no trade preferences in other markets) will find the EU an attractive market as long as the EU 
price minus the in-quota tariff exceeds their costs of producing and delivering these exports to the 
EU. However, once the EU price falls below costs + in-quota tariff, then there is effectively no 
profitable export outlet for this production, which will either not be produced at all or will be 
marketed nationally. 
Thus, the level of the world market price matters for the EU trade flows, even though – given the 
high MFN tariff - EU market access occurs only under some kind of preferential agreement. The 
reasoning in this section explains the findings reported in Nolte et al. (2012) (see section 4 of this 
report) showing that (a) total imports decline as the assumed level of world market price moves 
from low to high (in the latter case, they are zero), and (b) Brazil continues to fill its TRQ when 
world market price is low or ‘standard’ but drops out of the EU market when world market price is 
high, whereas EPA/EBA countries supply less when world market price is standard than when it is 
low (as they move down their supply curves – some dropping out altogether even for the standard 
level assumption), and supply no imports when world market price is assumed to be high. This 
study is discussed further in Section 3.  
The market depicted in panel 4 of Figure 2 is not the open world market; rather, it is a restricted 
market, created by EU trade policies, from which exporting countries that do not have a 
preferential agreement or participate in a multilateral TRQ with the EU for sugar are effectively 
excluded. This market is preferred to the open world market —by those exporting countries that 
can access it— because of the preference margin. Once the EU price reaches the world market 
price + the MFN tariff, the market depicted in panel 4 becomes the open world market, and the 
import supply function facing the EU becomes a horizontal line at the this price. This is not shown 
in the figure because, to draw it to scale would mean extending the figure considerably, and 
because for the analysis in this study it is assumed that EU around the level of world market price 
+ MFN tariff not relevant14.  
Although the EU is arguably oligopsonistic15 in this market, competitive behaviour is assumed. 
Throughout this theoretical analysis, it is assumed that the price gap between the world 
market sugar price and the EU price remains such that the MFN tariff rates are quite sufficient 
to deter any non-preferential sugar imports. Under these assumptions, the EU’s marginal ton 
of imported sugar is sourced from this preferential market, and hence it is the marginal supply 
price of this sugar to EU users (inclusive of transport and marketing costs) that determines the 
internal EU market price for sugar. 
                                                 
14 This would occur if either the world market price fell substantially, or the EU price rose substantially, relative 
to current and recent past levels. Given rising world demand for food, and for sugar as an ethanol feedstock, a 
sharp fall in the world market price is considered very unlikely. Moreover, as the ending of EU sugar quotas is 
expected to lower the internal price for sugar for human consumption, a steep rise in the EU price is also 
considered very unlikely.  
15 If we envisage EU import activities being performed by a limited number of large trading or sugar-using 
companies. 
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For simplicity, it is assumed in the figure that the price on the open world market is not 
affected by the policies examined here. In reality, the world market price could be affected by 
changes in trade flows resulting from the cessation of sugar quotas. On the import side, this 
could occur because (a) some of the imports from EPA/EBA countries are competitive at world 
market prices and as the EU preference margin shrinks, and once transport and other 
transaction costs are taken into account, they are diverted to the world market or (b) some of 
the countries with TRQs cease to fill them since, with the €98 in-quota tariff unchanged, quota  
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Figure 2.  The impact of quota abolition on EU sugar market. 
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rent may disappear making the world market more profitable. Regarding (a), LMC-ODI (2012) 
suggests that there are few countries in the EPA/EBA group for which such a displacement 
would occur. To the extent that this trade diversion occurs, both (a) and (b) would increase 
world market supply and exert downward pressure on the world market price. Any 
accompanying decrease in EU exports could help to offset this pressure. In practice, the net 
effect is likely to be small and is not taken into account here. Thus, although the EU has been 
a ‘large’ country in the past in world sugar markets due to it exports, since the 2006 reform of 
the sugar regime and given that market access occurs only on preferential terms and subject 
to one or another kind of constraint, the assumption of a constant world market price built into 
Figure 2 is not too unrealistic. 
Given this description of the sugar market conditions in which the EU operates, the price for 
quota sugar is PEU1, which reflects the cost of the marginal imported ton of sugar, and the 
price for out-of-quota sugar is PW. In equilibrium, region 1 and region 2 produce sugar 
quantities YQ1 and YQ2, respectively. Region 1 does not fully use its quota (YQ1 < Q1), whereas 
region 2 produces out-of quota sugar, YQ2 – Q2, which cannot enter the EU market for human 
consumption. 
In summary, in the circumstances depicted in Figure 2, the main consequence of the quota 
scheme is to separate EU sugar production between two markets with very different prices. 
Quota sugar is traded on the internal market for human consumption and out-of-quota sugar 
is traded only on industrial and/or international markets. Total internal sugar use is the sum of 
YF1 and IQC, which in the graph are determined in two separate markets (panels 2 and 3). The 
two markets are loosely linked by the open-market world sugar price PW but only to the extent 
that the position of the supply curve for EPA/EBA sugar is conditional on the level of the open-
market world sugar price. 
3.2. Production and consumption effects of quota abolition 
In the absence of quotas, there is no longer separation of EU sugar output between two 
markets with different prices. EU sugar can be sold for human consumption, industrial use 
and/or exported without any constraints, and all beet and sugar within the EU is sold at the 
same price. In Figure 2, the production and market outcomes in the no-quota situation are 
denoted by dotted lines and hollow bullet points, and by the superscript ‘2’ where necessary. 
Total internal use is given by the consolidated demand curve DT, and denoted by YCT2. In these 
circumstances, with the EU domestic price free to vary according to internal market conditions 
and no quota constraints, the appropriate aggregate supply curve is S2 = S1 + S2.  
Without any quota limits on supply, region 2 will expand its production, moving rightwards 
along its supply curve to Y22. At the same time, the industrial use of sugar, which now faces 
the same price as sugar for human consumption, will decline to IC (third panel). Both these 
behavioural reactions result in additional sugar being available on the EU market for food 
consumption. Furthermore, as long as there is a price gap between the EU and world markets, 
exports of EU-produced sugar should decline, since selling into the domestic market will be 
more profitable than exporting. Given the increased availability of EU-produced sugar on the 
home market for human consumption from these three sources (higher production in 
productive regions, decline in industrial sugar use and supplies diverted from the export 
market to the home market), the EU’s demand for imported sugar declines. Given the 
assumptions laid out above, the EU’s net demand for imported sugar shifts to the left, and the 
market clears when the internal price in the EU for the marginal ton of sugar produced and 
consumed equals that of the marginal ton imported, triggering a move leftwards down the 
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import supply curve to the import level YM2 in panel 4. Given our assumptions, most of the 
reduction in imports is at the expense of high-cost EPA/EBA suppliers. 
These adjustments cause the EU internal price, PEU1, to fall to PEU2. The extent of this price fall 
depends jointly on the elasticities of the internal sugar supply and the export supply function. 
In theory, the elasticity of domestic demand (human consumption and industrial use) are also 
relevant, although in practice the elasticity of human demand is very low, and it is this 
elasticity that dominates the combined domestic demand price sensitivity. Figure 2 suggests a 
very small increase only in EU human consumption of sugar.  
Finally, the lower internal price for sugar causes region 1 to reduce supply to 21Y  below its 
‘with-quota’ level. Hence, the net change in EU supply on the consolidated home market 
depends on the balance between the additional supply from regions that expand production, 
and the decline in supply from less EU productive regions, EBA/EPA countries and possibly also 
countries exporting to the EU under a TRQ. Clearly, the less elastic the supply of imported 
sugar, the greater the fall in the EU market price and the more likely it is that the net impact 
on the total quantity supplied to the home market is small. However, as already mentioned, 
the supply elasticity of imports is expected to increase with the narrowing of the price gap 
between EU and world triggered by the fall in the EU price.  
The regional supply response depends on productivity. In each case, a new position is reached 
on the regional supply curve corresponding to the single EU price. In the environment without 
producer risk that is depicted here, it is expected that less productive regions that formerly 
produced only quota sugar will reduce supply, whereas more productive regions that produced 
out-of quota sugar under the old regime will increase production.  
However, once producer risk is allowed for, this conclusion has to be qualified. We consider a 
case where, under the quota regime, the last ton of beet produced within the quota still earns 
considerable ‘quota rent’ (that is, the price for quota beet minus the marginal cost of 
production is significantly positive) while the first ton of out-of-quota sugar would incur a 
small loss (that is, the price for out-of-quota beet minus the marginal production cost is 
negative). Basic economic theory suggests that if yield were known with certainty, the 
producer or the region would produce each year exactly on quota. However, when yield is 
variable and therefore uncertain, and when the average loss on over-quota units (averaged 
over high-yield years) is less than the average loss of quota rent (averaged over low-yield 
years), the producer or region would aim to produce slightly over quota although strictly 
speaking over-quota production is not profitable. This behaviour can be viewed as a kind of 
insurance against expected loss in the face of uncertain yields16. In such cases, observed over-
quota production is not a fully reliable predictor of output expansion when quotas are no 
longer in force.  
Returning to the risk-free environment assumed in Figure 2, where all sugar —regardless of 
origin— is considered to be a homogeneous good, the aggregate EU sugar supply expands 
from YQP to YP, thereby replacing imports, which fall from YF1 – YQ (=YM1) to YCT2 - YP (=YM2). 
The share of non-TRQ imports (i.e. imports from EPA/EBA countries) in this smaller total falls. 
Now that all sugar produced in the EU may be sold without constraints on both the EU market 
and the world market, the simple theory underlying Figure 2 predicts that home production 
will replace imported production as long as EU prices are lower than world market prices + the 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that the model used for the analysis (CAPRI) allows for this type of behaviour. 
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MFN tariff, taking into account the quantities imported under TRQs and from EPA/EBA 
countries that are competitive at EU prices. It follows that no EU sugar would be exported 
unless the domestic price is driven down by increased supply to the world market level. At the 
same time, our theory suggest that imports would cease once the preference margin (allowing 
for any in-quota tariff) is eliminated for all potential import sources, since at that point the EU 
market would have no price advantage for any other exporting country. Thus, at higher EU 
prices, the EU imports, then over a small range of prices it may be autarkic, and below that 
range it exports. This reasoning assumes that imported and domestic sugar are homogeneous 
goods, and predicts that the EU will not import and export simultaneously.  
In reality, however, many basic products that, at least superficially, could be thought of as 
homogeneous, are both imported and exported by developed countries. This is also the case 
for the EU and sugar. To adapt the figure in order to give a full and rigorous account of why 
this occurs would make it very complicated. Instead, we give a qualitative explanation of why 
it is likely to happen (in both scenarios). 
The presence of both imports and exports in Scenario 1 (quotas in force) is easily explained by 
the strong market segregation caused by EU sugar policy. Imports are either from low-cost 
sugar-producing countries that also trade on the world market but whose quantity allowed into 
the EU is limited by tight TRQs, or from higher-cost ACPs and LDCs for whom the EU is the 
preferred - or perhaps the only - export market. On the other hand, EU exports consist of out-
of-quota sugar that cannot be sold on the domestic market, and whose exports are subject to 
a quantity limit. Thus, there is no effective competition between imports and exports on the 
domestic market for food use. 
In Scenario 2, all sugar produced in the EU may be either used internally or exported, 
depending on relative prices. Moreover, the limit on EU exports is removed although the other 
trade measures described in Table 2 remain in place. Basic economic theory suggests that it 
would be irrational to export EU sugar at a world price that is lower than the internal price and 
the marginal price of imports. However, this ignores the fact that imports and exports of 
‘sugar’ are not fully substitutable. Imported sugar is largely raw cane sugar, which is refined in 
the EU, whereas exported sugar is mainly refined white sugar. Thus, each product faces its 
own demand conditions. Imported sugar is demanded by the refineries that process it further 
for the EU market or possibly by non-food processors that use it as a direct input into an 
industrial process17, whereas exported white sugar is demanded by importing countries with 
insufficient refining capacity of their own to serve their human consumption market. These two 
forms of sugar are, in fact, differentiated goods, around which market preferences – based on 
technology, commercial practices and established supply chains – have developed.  
When the EU price of sugar falls in Scenario 2, Figure 2 shows that imports are expected to fall 
because some suppliers find the lower EU price unattractive or unprofitable. It is not possible 
to explain, in this simplified theoretical model, why EU producers would accept to sell their 
refined sugar at a world market price below the one inside the EU, as may have happened in 
some recent years. To do so would require adapting the model to include further 
differentiation of sugar and of preferences, and/or market imperfections18. What is not shown 
                                                 
17 Note that raw sugar production is not an intermediate stage in producing ethanol from sugar beet or cane.  
18 The CAPRI model uses the Armington assumption to recognise that domestic production and imports are not 
perfect substitutes, and that trade flows in both directions can exist simultaneously. This allows preferences 
based solely on relative prices to be modified by past empirical trade patterns, which are taken to reflect 
‘market preferences’ for different types of sugar according to their origin. The Armington elasticity for sugar in 
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in our simple figure is that, in the differentiated world market for refined white sugar, there 
may be some demand for EU sugar at prices above the world market price. Moreover, in the 
quota-extension scenario, there is a WTO binding on EU sugar exports which is lifted in the 
quota-expiry scenario. Thus, the niche demand for higher-priced EU white sugar on the world 
market may not have been fully met in the quota-extension scenario, and hence EU exports 
could even (theoretically) increase in Scenario 2 due to the removal of this constraint and the 
resulting decrease in the gap between the EU and world market prices.  
Summarising this analysis, the main expected impacts of quota expiry can be listed as follows: 
• beet (and hence, sugar) production tends to increase in regions formerly supplying out-
of-quota sugar, although this may not occur in reality in cases where a very small quota 
over-shoot was observed in most years, whereas it declines in regions that previously 
produced only quota sugar; 
• total EU sugar supplied onto the consolidated EU market increases; 
• domestic human consumption increases;  
• industrial use of EU sugar declines due to the price increase facing these users; 
• total EU domestic use of sugar increases, but this impact is likely to be small; 
• imports fall, whereas the reaction of exports depends on the degree of differentiation 
between EU and non-EU sugar, both on the EU market and on the world market; 
• the share of imports from high-cost EPA/EBA countries falls. 
The above effects are conditional upon there being a significant fall in the price of the marginal 
ton of imported sugar. It is worth describing the two limiting cases in this process. (1) 
imported sugar supply is perfectly elastic at the EU with-quota price, and there is no change in 
the internal EU price after quota removal. In this case, more productive regions expand supply 
but less productive regions would not reduce their supply, and hence the aggregate EU 
production response would be greater. This means that the adjustment through trade flows 
would be more extreme. Imports from EPA/EBA countries could be drastically reduced. (2) 
imported sugar supply is very inelastic, and there is a large fall in the internal EU price. In this 
case, aggregate EU sugar production could actually fall (due to much larger reductions in less 
productive areas and smaller increases in more productive regions), internal demand would 
increase by more, and import flows would be less affected. However, quota rents for countries 
exporting to the EU under preferential agreements would be squeezed to a greater extent.  
3.2 Income effects 
Here, for simplicity, the absence of producer risk is assumed. The regional income change 
experienced by beet producers will vary depending on whether the region previously had out-
of-quota sugar (due to greater comparative advantage in sugar production).  
The impact is illustrated in Figure 3 at regional level. Following previous analysis, it is 
assumed that quota removal reduces the EU sugar price from PEU1 to PEU2. In region 1, which 
had no out-of quota sugar, income (producer surplus) falls by area A due to the price and 
quantity fall. In region 2, producer surplus on (previous) quota sugar declines (loss of the area 
A + B) but increases on amounts above that (area C). The overall effect depends on how much 
                                                                                                                                                        
CAPRI is 10, which is one of the highest in the model, but still sufficiently low that imports and exports do not 
eclipse each other as the relative magnitude of their prices switches.  
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is produced beyond the old quota limit. If out-of-quota sugar was substantial and the 
production response when quotas are removed is strong, then region 2 is more likely to gain 
(i.e., area C > area A + B). However, it is also possible that area C < area A + B, in which 
case there would be an income loss although producers are still maximising their profit and 
producing at optimal levels given each policy regime. Thus, for regions formerly producing 
out-of-quota sugar, the income effect cannot be unambiguously determined.  
In summary, it is expected that income decreases in regions with no out-of-quota sugar, 
whereas in regions with out-of-quota sugar the effect is indeterminate. Aggregate income may 
increase or decrease depending on the balance between regions that gain relative to those 
regions benefiting from the quota abolition. 
Figure 3. Effect of quota removal on regional production and income. 
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4 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF EU SUGAR QUOTA ABOLITION  
There have been various quantitative studies of the impact of the 2006 sugar reform (for example, 
Brüntrup, 2006; Dillen et al., 2006; Frandsen et al., 2003; Gohin and Bureau, 2006; Buysse et al., 
2007). However, there are fewer empirical studies that have investigated the impact of sugar 
quota abolition against the background of the other measures that are currently in force in the 
sector, and with which we can compare the results presented in this report. Table 6 summarises 
the modelling approaches and main results of three recent studies.  
Table 5. Comparison of previous relevant results. 
Study LEI (2010) DG AGRI (2011)1 Nolte et al. (2012)2 
Model CAPRI AGLINK-COSIMO Unnamed spatial price equilibrium model 
Coverage Market module: ca. 50 
commodities, 60 
countries grouped into 28 
trade blocks 
39 commodities, 52 
regions 
One product 
104 producing regions, 
90 consuming regions 
Simulation horizon 2020 2020 2019/20 
Change(%) in  
EU sugar production 10.8 1.7 16.5 
EU sugar price n.r. -3.5 -26.5 
World market sugar price n.r. -0.2 -1.7 
Imports (mn t):  
baseline, scenario 
5.2, 5.7 3.7, 3.5 3.0, 0.9 
Exports (mn t): 
Baseline, scenario 
0.9, 2.2 1.1, 1.2 0, 0 
Change in trade position Net importer status 
maintained, net imports 
decrease 
Net importer status 
maintained, net imports 
decrease very slightly 
Net importer status 
maintained, net imports 
decrease by two thirds. 
 “n.r.” = not reported. 
1.  European Commission (2011b). 
2. The results shown assume that the world sugar price for 2019/20, should EU quotas be continued after 
2014/15, is €362/t (white sugar equivalent) (as projected by the OECD/FAO Outlook in 2010). The paper also 
gives results for higher and lower assumed values of world market prices.  
 
The first two studies use well-known partial equilibrium models that depict the markets and trade 
flows for all major agricultural commodities. It should be pointed out that the LEI study exploits an 
earlier version of CAPRI in which the new sugar module that is used for the study reported here 
was not available, and where the baseline is calibrated on an earlier set of assumptions. The DG 
AGRI study, performed in the second part of 2011, uses a more similar but not identical baseline 
to the one used in our CAPRI-based study. However, the many differences between the AGLINK-
COSIMO and CAPRI models are such that one would not necessarily expect very similar results, 
even if identical baseline assumptions had been used.  
For example, AGLINK-COSIMO is unable to model bilateral trade flows and therefore cannot 
represent the TRQs that determine market access conditions for a large share of EU sugar imports. 
Moreover, it models EU27 as composed of two separate blocks – EU15 and EU12 – whereas it is 
clear from Section 2.1 that the distribution of productivity and competitiveness in sugar production 
across Member States, and the pattern of within- and out-of-quota supply, do not match this 
simple division. By contrast, CAPRI can account for bilateral TRQs. Moreover, although CAPRI 
solves for market equilibrium in the sugar market in three blocks (EU15, EU10 and EU2), the price 
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for sugar beet is determined at Member State level, and production impacts can be disaggregated 
to NUTS 2 level. On the other hand, unlike CAPRI, AGLINK-COSIMO can simulate trade in 
biofuels19 as well as the workings of the EU isoglucose sector (production, use and net trade in 
isoglucose, and the links between the isoglucose and sugar markets).  
Comparing the first two studies, it turns out that the impacts reported from the LEI study are 
somewhat larger than those obtained by DG AGRI with AGLINK-COSIMO. Indeed, the impacts 
obtained from the AGLINK-COSIMO simulation are modest, and well within the margin of error to 
be expected with this type of model. Likewise, the impacts on EU isoglucose production and use 
obtained with AGLINK-COSIMO (not shown in the table) are small: with the expiry of quota, 
isoglucose production is 2.3% higher, use is 1.5% higher, and the EU’s net exporting position is 
very marginally increased compared with the increase that would have occurred if quotas had been 
extended. In conjunction with a 0.3% increase in domestic food use of sugar, this implies a slight 
decrease in sugar’s share of the EU sweetener market.  
AGLINK-COSIMO and CAPRI, being partial equilibrium models that focus on agricultural markets 
and trade, do not endogenise all forces acting on world and domestic sugar prices. This can be 
considered a limitation now that agricultural commodity markets are more closely linked to those 
of other sectors because of their greater sensitivity to developments in energy markets. Sugar, as 
a major feedstock for ethanol in world terms, is one of the specific commodities through which 
these links operate. Therefore, the DG AGRI study included a sensitivity analysis on the 
(exogenous) level of world sugar prices.  
The DG AGRI study results given in Table 5 correspond to a scenario in which the world market 
price for white sugar is not fixed. It is simulated by the model as €313/t in the baseline, and 
€312/t in the quota abolition scenario. A second scenario was run in order to perform a sensitivity 
analysis on the level of world market price, assuming it to be fixed at €250/t in both the with-
quota scenario and the quota expiry scenario.  
When the world market price is held fixed at €250/t in both the scenarios, the EU is a net importer 
on a greater scale (4.43 million tons in the quota-extended scenario, falling to 3.96 million tons in 
the quota-expiry scenario), and the imports from the EPA/EBA countries fall by 9.4%. The most 
striking difference compared with the results based on the higher (endogenous) world market price 
is that beet and sugar production fall in the EU (both by 3.9%) and the fall in the producer price of 
white sugar is larger. Moreover, the share of isoglucose in domestic sweetener demand is 
somewhat smaller. 
The model used by Nolte et al. (2012) contains just one product – sugar – and assumes the expiry 
of sugar quotas in 2014/15. The impacts on EU production and on prices, and on the EU’s trade 
position, are shown to be highly dependent on the world market price for sugar, which is 
exogenous in the model. We note that the level of this price is set exogenously in the no-expiry 
scenario for 2019/20 at €362/t (as projected by OECD and FAO (2010)), which is somewhat higher 
than the value calculated endogenously by AGLINK-COSIMO (2011). When Nolte et al. assume the 
world market price to be €292/t (1 standard deviation lower than the central projected value), EU 
sugar production is still 9% higher without quotas than if quotas were continued, which contrasts 
strongly with the AGLINK-COSIMO result based on a low (€250/t) world market price. When the 
world sugar price is assumed to be €431/t (1 standard deviation higher than the central 
projection), the EU price without quotas is 54.4% lower than its value if quotas are continued 
                                                 
19 Shortly to become available in CAPRI. 
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(€630/t), EU production is higher by 32% than with quotas and the high world market price, and 
EU imports go to zero.  
With the central price assumption, ten Member States have higher production in the no-quota 
situation than if quotas were extended, whereas nine Member States (ES, FIN, GR, HU, IT, LT, PT, 
RO, SLK) have lower production levels. Output in France and Germany is much higher without 
quotas (taken together, an increase of 25%). Clearly, this model assumes a much more robust 
reaction to quota expiry than AGLINK-COSIMO, and implies that the constraints imposed by the 
quota regime (and the corresponding quota rents earned on quota sugar) are much higher – for 
some Member States – than those implicit in AGLINK-COSIMO.  
The first two studies summarised in Table 5 do not report the impacts on import flows by country 
of origin20 whereas the study by Nolte et al. gives considerable detail on this issue. According to 
Nolte et al., EU quota expiry will put an end to sugar imports into the EU from all (non-ACP) LDCs, 
regardless of the level of the world market price that is assumed21. By contrast, the EU would still 
import sugar from ex-ACP countries (but at much lower levels) when world market prices are 
assumed to be at the central level projected by OECD-FAO or below. Of the 12 ex-ACP countries or 
blocs of countries that would provide EU imports in 2019/20 should quotas remain in place, seven 
would still export to the EU without quotas in the low-world-market-price scenario, but only three 
(Mauritius, Swaziland and Fiji) would remain as import sources when the central price projection is 
used. As already stated, when the high level of world market prices used in the study is assumed, 
all imports are zero.   
A simulation study by LMC-ODI (2012), performed with an unnamed model whose characteristics 
are not described, also finds that the impact of EU quota removal on EPA (ex-ACP) countries and 
LDCs depends on world market price levels. When world market prices are high, EU imports fall 
with quota removal, squeezing out some EPA and LDC imported sugar, but when world market 
prices are low, impacts on import flows are far smaller. This study classifies the main EPA and LDC 
sugar-exporting countries according to whether they are high- or low-cost producers, and whether 
or not they have access to alternative markets when import demand from the EU falls22. The 
results are a reminder that sugar-exporting EPA countries and LDCs cannot be considered as 
homogeneous blocks when analysing the impacts of EU sugar quota abolition.  
 
                                                 
20 In the main quota abolition scenario presented by DG AGRI (2011), aggregate imports from the EPA and 
EBA countries fall by 6.5%. 
21 In the with-quota scenario and based on the central projection for the world market sugar price, the EU 
would source 18% of it sugar imports from these countries.  
22 Five countries - Barbados, Belize, Mauritius, Guyana and Fiji – are in the worst situation (high cost + limited 
access to alternative markets). Seven countries – Cambodia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe – are in the best-case position (low cost + access to alternative markets). 
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5 THE CAPRI MODEL 
5.1  Main features of CAPRI 
CAPRI is a spatial, partial equilibrium (PE) model specifically designed to analyse CAP measures 
and trade policies for agricultural products (Britz and Witzke, 2008). It consists of two interlinked 
modules, the supply module and the market module, which allow production, demand, trade and 
prices to be calculated simultaneously and interactively.  
The databases used by CAPRI come from well-documented, official and harmonised data sources, 
for the most part EUROSTAT, FAOSTAT, OECD and extractions from the Farm Accounting Data 
Network (FADN). The organising principle of the CAPRI supply module database is an ‘Activity 
Based Table of Accounts’, where activity levels (measured in hectares, livestock numbers etc) are 
linked to inputs and outputs via technical coefficients, and to values via prices. The connection 
between the individual activities and markets are the activity levels. 
The supply module consists of regional agricultural supply models for EU27, the Western Balkans, 
Norway and Turkey, which depict farming decisions in detail at the NUTS 2 level (cropping and 
livestock activities, yields, farm income, nutrient balances, GHG emissions, etc.). Its mathematical 
programming approach allows a high degree of flexibility in modelling CAP measures as well as in 
capturing important interactions between production activities, and with the environment. 
The market module is a deterministic, partial, spatial model with global coverage, where about 50 
commodities (primary and secondary agricultural products) and 60 countries grouped into 28 trade 
blocks are modelled. It is spatial as it includes bi-lateral trade flows and policies between trade 
blocks in the model. The supply and market modules are linked iteratively. 
The CAPRI model uses a two-stage Armington system in order to model substitution between 
imports, and between imports and domestic sales. In this system, a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) function allows the model to capture the pure economic behaviour of agents 
(through the relative changes in import price and substitution elasticities), but also to take account 
of a 'preference' given to imports from a specific origin (through shares of historical import flows). 
This means that trade flows are not driven solely by the difference between domestic market 
prices and import prices.  
Within the EU, perfect markets are assumed for all products such that prices for all Member States 
move together within a market block23. The parameters of the behavioural equations for supply, 
feed demand, processing industry and final demand are taken from other studies and modelling 
systems, and calibrated to projected quantities and prices in the simulation year. Major outputs of 
the market module include bilateral trade flows, market balances and producer and consumer 
prices for the agricultural commodities and world country aggregates. 
Final demand functions are derived from indirect utility functions of consumer prices and per capita 
income, specified as Generalised Leontief functions, which observe all required theoretical 
properties of demand systems. For traded products, the model uses a two-stage Armington 
system described above. The higher level determines the composition of total demand from 
imports and domestic sales as a function of the relation between the internal market price and the 
average import price. The lower stage determines the import shares from different origins. The 
substitution elasticity on the higher level is smaller than for the lower one, i.e. consumers are less 
                                                 
17 CAPRI models the internal market as consisting of 3 blocks: EU15, EU12 and EU2 (Bulgaria and Romania). 
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flexible in substituting between domestic and imported goods than between imported goods of 
different origins. For most products, the substitution elasticities are 8 for the upper level and 10 
for the lower level24. This latter elasticity is rather high compared to other models. 
CAPRI models both erga omnes and bilateral TRQs25. To deal with the discontinuity in import price 
caused by the TRQ, a sigmoid function is used, which effectively smooths the ‘kinks’ that occur at 
the two points of discontinuity. CAPRI can handle both ad valorem and specific tariffs, both for 
MFN tariffs and in-quota tariff for TRQs. 
Welfare analysis is conducted in CAPRI based on the classical elements of consumer and producer 
surplus. Changes in consumer surplus measure the changes in consumers’ purchasing power 
resulting from a (policy-induced) price change. On the producer side, CAPRI uses changes in gross 
value added (defined as the difference between revenues and intermediate input costs including 
direct payments) as the main indicator. Taxpayer costs refer to the CAP policy instruments 
explicitly covered in CAPRI, i.e. direct payments, market intervention, export subsidies, etc., 
financed by EU or national budgets, minus revenues from import tariffs.   
Among CAPRI’s strengths are the rich detail on the supply side of the model and its ability to 
provide results for the EU at sub-Member State (NUTS 2) level26, whilst at the same time being 
able to model global world agricultural trade, with the EU’s most important trade partners 
separately identified and bilateral trade flows between them and the EU accounted for. This makes 
it well suited for the questions posed here in this study. Nevertheless, certain caveats apply 
regarding the sensitivity of results at NUTS 2 level with respect to the modelling of isoglucse 
(explained in Chapter 5.2).  
5.2  Modelling the EU sugar market and sugar policies in CAPRI  
Since the base year of the current version of CAPRI is 2004, the model has to incorporate the 
policies in force before the 2006 reform and also allow these policies to change according to the 
2006 reform27. Sugar beet quotas are defined in the legislation at Member State level. Each 
Member State allocates its quotas to sugar factories that distribute them in the form of 'delivery 
rights' to growers. Quotas are fixed in the legislation for white sugar and therefore need to be 
converted to their sugar beet equivalent using a processing coefficient, which is specific to each 
Member State. Quota (A and B) available at regional level has to be calculated within the model, 
taking account of over-quota production. 
The price transmission from EU sugar prices to beet prices is also modelled. A- and B-beet prices 
are linked to EU sugar prices, whereas C-beet prices are linked to world market prices. The value 
of the by-product molasses is taken into account in this price conversion. Some Member States28 
did not apply the classic scheme of A- and B-quotas but rather a 'pooled' price system averaging 
A- and B-sugar prices. This is recognised in CAPRI for the pre-2006 period. Those new Member 
States that joined before 2006 are assumed to apply the classic A-B quota system. 
                                                 
24 This upper-level elasticity for sugar in CAPRI is 10, which indicates that whilst imported sugar can substitute 
for domestically produced sugar, the EU market treats them as far-from-perfect substitutes. 
25 CAPRI assumes that countries fill bilateral TRQs first, then attempt to profit from erga omnes TRQs, which 
are filled by countries in declining order of price-competitiveness. 
26 CAPRI calculates agricultural producer prices at Member State level, so a particular ‘EU producer price’ is an 
average of these prices. Prices at NUTS2 level within a Member State, are identical to the corresponding 
Member State prices. 
27 For more details, see Adenäuer (2005).  
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There is also a price link to the ethanol industry. This link recognises the policy constraint whereby 
out-of-quota beet can be sold within the EU only for industrial use and only at an unsupported 
price. 
In order to account for the production of C-sugar or, from 2006 onwards, out-of-quota sugar 
(whose marginal production cost is generally higher than that of competing crops), an expected-
profit maximisation formulation is used for sugar supply, where the motivation for planned out-of-
quota production is insurance against yield uncertainty. Country-specific estimates of risk aversion 
are derived. However, even the expected profit maximisation framework is unable to fully explain 
over-quota production in some Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK). 
Therefore, the marginal cost function was calibrated to historically observed beet production. 
In order to adapt the CAPRI model for this study, careful attention was paid to the depiction of the 
various TRQs involving sugar (for details of these TRQs, see section 2.3).  
In the quota-extension scenario, sugar beet areas in Member States were calibrated in CAPRI so 
as to be consistent with the 2011 AGLINK baseline including sugar quotas. These projections 
indicate an increasing trend in total acreage of beet (for sugar and industrial use combined) up to 
2020 if quotas are extended to that year. This increase is driven by a strong response from sugar 
growers to increasing demand for sugar as a feedstock for ethanol, which in turn is stimulated by 
the low beet price to industrial users as long as quotas remain. Of course, this price advantage 
disappears when quotas expire29.  
In addition, for the sensitivity analysis concerning the share of isoglucose in the EU sweetener 
market, it was necessary to translate the different assumptions about this share into assumptions 
about the corresponding impact on sugar demand. This adaptation has two aspects. First, the total 
size of the sweetener market in the baseline 2020 has to be calculated. This was done on the basis 
of the AGLINK-COSIMO baseline figures, adjusted to conform with assumed shares of isoglucose of 
10% and 20%. A linear approximation scaled these figures to meet the corresponding total 
sweetener and sugar use in CAPRI30. 
In theory, a further adjustment should be made to account for the fact that additional wheat and 
maize will be demanded as isoglucose feedstocks. This requires converting the increase in 
isoglucose production into extra demand for wheat and maize (by assumption, in proportion to the 
existing use of these feedstocks for isoglucose)31. These demand changes (sugar, wheat and 
maize) are not allocated to any particular Member State, although it can be expected that 
isoglucose production would react according to available production capacities, which at present 
are limited to certain Member States (see Table 1). As the isoglucose sector is not modelled in 
CAPRI, a simplified approach was taken that assumes a proportionate general decrease or increase 
in all Member States, i.e. without considering actual or expected potential. This assumption leads 
to a less distortive distribution of results at NUTS 2 level, compared to an alternative approach 
that would assume an allocation of demand changes to particular Member States or geographical 
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom. 
29 When CAPRI is calibrated to lower estimates of 2020 acreages, extrapolated from current trends, most of the 
impacts of quota expiry are broadly the same. It turns out that the differences that do occur affect the more 
sensitive issues (imports from third countries – especially poorer countries benefiting from unlimited duty-free 
access – and impacts for a few Member States). 
30 Note that, when the quota-extension scenario is run AGLINK-COSIMO, the (endogenous) share of isoglucose 
in the total EU sweetener market is 3.4%. 
31 For the conversion rates between wheat and maize, and isoglucose, see Appendix 1. 
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regions based on production capacities. While the aggregate impact would be similar, the latter 
approach would depict a more diverse distribution of impact at Member State and NUTS 2 levels.  
A trial run indicated that the effects of allowing for additional demand for wheat and maize when 
isoglucose production is assumed to increase are extremely small. Therefore, this adjustment is 
not incorporated in the results presented below. 
5.3 Scenarios examined in this study 
The purpose of this study is to compare the situation after the expiry of sugar quotas with a 
situation in which sugar quotas are extended and still in place in 2020. Thus, as far as the policy 
settings are concerned, there are only two alternatives – with and without sugar quotas. Since 
isoglucose quotas are in place only as a countervailing measure to sugar quotas, they too will be 
removed in the scenario depicting the expiry of sugar quotas. Since isoglucose demand is not 
modelled in CAPRI, the impact of the expiry of isoglucose quotas on isoglucose demand, and the 
inroads that isoglucose might make into the sugar market, cannot be simulated simultaneously 
with that of sugar quota expiry, and hence it is impossible to calculate endogenously – based on 
the estimated impact of sugar quota removal on sugar demand – what the resulting shares in the 
total sweetener market for sugar and isoglucose would be.  
Therefore, because of uncertainty regarding the impacts of quota expiry in the isoglucose sector 
and its interactions with sugar markets, a total of three no-quota scenarios were examined. 
Specifically, the uncertainty regarding isoglucose concerns the extent of substitution of sugar by 
isoglucose in the sweetener market when quotas for both products no longer exist. Our expiry 
scenarios represent three different possibilities. The first corresponds to the assumption that there 
is no substitution between sugar and isoglucose. In this case, sugar demand in the no-quota 
situation is calculated within CAPRI using a demand function that does not contain a cross-price 
elasticity for isoglucose. Effectively, developments in the isoglucose market are ignored. It should 
be borne in mind that this scenario implies no assumption about the share of sugar in the total 
sweetener market, and that current market shares would be maintained in the expiry situation 
only if the demand for each product reacts in the same proportion. In other words, by assuming 
that there is no substitution between the two sweeteners, CAPRI’s demand function for sugar gives 
the corresponding domestic sugar consumption independent of isoglucose. The share of isoglucose 
here remains indeterminate. 
The other two no-quota scenarios assume that there is substitution between sugar and isoglucose. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the market share of isoglucose in the total sweetener market 
increases to 10% and 20%, respectively32. To model these scenarios, the demand functions for 
sugar are shifted downwards by the relevant amounts. These are exogenous, manual adjustments 
and do not work inside the model via price responses and cross-price elasticities, or substitution 
elasticities. The various scenarios are summarised in Table 6.  
                                                 
32 The share of isoglucose in the total sweetener market is thought to be currently about 5%. CAPRI has been 
calibrated to the baseline of the AGLINK-COSIMO model, which simulates the share of isoglucose in the 
sweetener market with quota extension at 3.4% in 2020. However, since CAPRI does not model isoglucose, it 
is not possible to say with precision what the implicit share is in the with-quota scenario simulated with CAPRI, 
or in the first no-quota scenario in which no share has been explicitly assumed and imposed when simulating 
with CAPRI.  
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Table 6. Scenarios simulated in this study.  
Sugar quotas are 
extended to 2020 
Sugar quotas expire in 2015/16 and are no longer in force in 
2020 
Scenario 1 Scenarios 2.* 
Scenario 2.00 No substitution between sugar and isoglucose 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2.10(20): Isoglucose share of sweetener market 
increases to 10(20)% 
 
CAPRI is a comparative static model, and its policy comparisons relate to a particular year. In this 
study, year of the comparison is 2020, and all exogenous variables are calibrated to their 
projected values for this year (which have been obtained from other sources, in particular the DG 
AGRI outlook projections, see European Commission, 2011a).  Table 7 presents the most 
important of these exogenous assumptions, which are crucial for driving the model in both 
scenarios. 
Table 7. Exogenous assumptions for 2020, both scenarios. 
Macroeconomic variable  Value/growth rate Source 
Population (country-specific) For EU27, +0.25% p.a. (2009-2020), reaching 513, 974.98 million in 2020 
UN Population Statistics 2020 
Exchange rate USD/EUR 1.5 DG ECFIN 
Crude Oil (USD/barrel) 118 DG ECFIN 
GDP index (2005=1)       EU15 
EU12 
1.22 
1.70 
Eurostat 
EU biofuel targets (as 
specified in the Renewable 
Energy Directive1) 
Filled 
 
1. Directive 2009/28/EC. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 Production, imports and exports 
As Table 8 reports, the simulations show that sugar beet production in 2020, with quotas in force, 
would be as nearly as high as its 2004 level, despite both the 2006 reform of the sugar regime, 
which resulted in the net removal of more than 5 million tons of sugar quota, and the cessation of 
export refunds for sugar in 2008. This implies that other counterbalancing factors, like the 
increased demand for biofuels to fulfil the renewable energy target for 2020 in the transport 
sector, are assumed to exert a strong countervailing pressure, replacing virtually all of the 
renounced quotas for human consumption, much of which had to be exported. 
Table 8 compares the production of beet, sugar produced from beet and other related commodities 
and products, in the different scenarios, assuming the AGLINK-based reference scenario. 
Production of beet and sugar from beet is higher in the without-quota scenarios. However, as the 
assumed share of isoglucose in the sweetener market increases, the differences in production 
relative to the with-quota situation become smaller.  
It has to be recalled throughout this report that CAPRI aggregates the production of all uses of 
sugar beet, measured in white sugar equivalent, under the heading of ‘sugar production’. 
Therefore, the figure given in Table 8 of 20.096 million tons of sugar produced in the with-quota 
scenario (Scenario 1) includes not only quota sugar and out-of-quota sugar, but also the sugar 
equivalent of ethanol and other non-food commodities, produced either directly from sugar beet or 
using sugar as an ingredient. 
Table 8. Production. 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Variable 
Base year 
2004 
Scenario 1 
2020 
Increased market share 
of isoglucose  
Increased market share 
of isoglucose 
   
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
Change with respect to Scenario 1 Change with respect to Scenario 1  
 1000 tons 
1000 tons Per cent 
Sugar beet1 128,904.7 126,442.3 4,902.6 2,976.4 194.8 3.88 2.35 0.15 
‘Sugar’ 20,325.7 20,096.7 851.5 539.7 67.5 4.24 2.69 0.34 
Total cereals1 254,400.0 318,555.3 279.0 190.2 46.9 0.09 0.06 0.01 
Soft wheat1 133,232.3 143,981.1 159.5 105.1 17.9 0.11 0.07 0.01 
Barley1 57,609.9 58,290.6 17.2 13.4 5.9 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Grain Maize1 62,058.8 66,688.0 60.2 39.4 9.3 0.09 0.06 0.01 
Oilseeds1 17,116.9 32,643.1 -9.1 0.2 11.7 -0.03 0.00 0.04 
 1000 tons oil equivalent2 1000 tons oil equivalent Per cent 
Ethanol 1,187.5 9,756.8 7.5 7.9 13.8 0.08 0.08 0.14 
Biodiesel 1,863.2 13,265.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1. Gross production (including losses and on-farm use) (i.e. area × yield). Gross production is reported rather 
than net production for all the crops in the table, because CAPRI reports only the former for sugar beet.  
2. The rates of conversion between weights and volumes in this table can be found in Appendix 1. 
Table 8 shows that the production of sugar beet is nearly 4% higher without the restriction of 
quotas, but this difference is almost eliminated when it is assumed that, due to quota expiry, the 
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isoglucose share of the total sweetener market expands to 20%. Since the isoglucose market and 
the interactions between sugar and isoglucose in a free market are not modelled in this study, the 
20% market share in Scenario 2.20 is not part of the model solution; rather, it is an assumption 
only, representing a somewhat extreme position (as discussed in section 2.3).  
The production figures for ethanol and biodiesel given in Table 8 are totals produced from all 
feedstocks. Hence, the differences in ethanol production between the no-quota scenarios reflect 
differences in total ethanol produced, and not exclusively in ethanol produced from sugar beet 
(although this component will account for most of the change between the no-quota scenarios). 
Sugar is not the main arable crop feedstock for ethanol in the EU (see Table 8), which explains 
why the percentage differences in total production are quite small between the no-quota scenarios. 
As mentioned above, the higher level of beet production without quotas is accompanied by slightly 
higher production of wheat, barley and maize. At first sight, this result is counterintuitive, since 
these latter three crops compete with sugar beet for arable area. However, they are also 
alternative feedstocks for ethanol. In the no-quota situation, the sugar beet price is now the same 
whether the beet is used for processing into sugar for human consumption or for transformation 
into industrial products. The beet price facing ethanol producers, which used to be well below the 
price of beet for food use, is considerably higher than in the quota extension scenario, thereby 
making sugar beet less attractive as a feedstock and improving the attractiveness of the 
alternatives, especially wheat and maize.  
Table 9 shows that, in Scenario 1, when biofuel producers can buy beet at the low out-of-quota 
price, it provides 24% of the feedstock for ethanol. This share falls to 20.8% in Scenario 2.00 
when sugar is replaced by alternative feedstocks, each more or less in proportion to its share in 
Scenario 1. However, as sugar loses ground to isoglucose (Scenarios 2.10 and 2.20), beet reverts 
to its original importance as an ethanol feedstock.  
The CAPRI results indicate that, in Scenario 2.00, the extra demand for cereals as a biofuel 
feedstock just cancels out the negative impact on the production of these crops due to competition 
with beet for arable land. This does not mean that in the quota-expiry scenarios there are no 
negative impacts of higher beet acreage on other land uses. In particular, sugar beet substitutes 
(albeit to a modest extent) for fodder (except maize fodder) on arable land, for grass land and set 
aside (not shown in Table 8). 
Table 9. Share (%) of feedstock in (first generation) bio-ethanol production. 
Feedstock Scenario 1 Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2.10 Scenario 2.20 
Wheat 33.6 35.3 34.6 33.5 
Barley 14.5 14.8 14.7 14.5 
Rye 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.0 
Oats 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 
Maize 15.0 15.5 15.3 14.9 
Other cereals 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 
Sugar 24.0 20.8 22.1 24.2 
 
Tables 10 and 11 report the differences in trade flows between the quota-extension scenario, on 
the one hand, and the three versions of the quota-expiry situation. It should be taken into account 
that in these tables, ‘sugar’ refers specifically to the commodity sugar —largely raw sugar, in the 
case of imports, and largely refined white sugar, in the case of exports— both types of sugar 
measured in white sugar equivalents. 
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Table 10. Imports. 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Commodity 
Base year 
2004 
Scenario 1 
2020 
Increased market share 
of isoglucose  
Increased market share 
of isoglucose 
   
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
Change with respect to Scenario 1 Change with respect to Scenario 1  
1000 tons 
1000 tons Per cent 
Sugar, total 2,941.7 4,030.8 -1,716.8 -2,108.3 -2,534.1 -42.6 -52.3 -62.9 
Brazil 653.8 555.2 -20.9 -28.0 -38.5 -3.8 -5.0 -6.9 
EPA/EBA 1,722.6 3,075.3 -1,622.3 -2,001.2 -2,410.0 -52.8 -65.1 -78.4 
Total cereals 14,343.9 10,608.3 169.6 98.7 7.1 1.6 0.9 0.1 
Oilseeds 17,405.8 18,367.3 37.0 41.4 50.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 
 
Table 10 shows that the increased EU beet and sugar output after quota expiry has a strong 
import-substitution effect. Moreover, this effect is much stronger in the case of the higher-cost 
import sources. By contrast, the impact on lower-cost imports from Brazil (under its bilateral TRQ 
and also the EU’s erga omnes TRQ) is quite small. The very high EU demand for Brazilian sugar is 
reflected as well in a corresponding high quota rent, which allows the Brazilian sugar to keep its 
market share on the EU sugar market. The level of the quota rent in the baseline influences the 
distribution of the EU import reduction of sugar between import sources, as explained in section 
3.1. With higher levels of the assumed share of the sweetener market captured by isoglucose, the 
negative impact on third-country imports is exacerbated. 
 
 Table 11. Exports. 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Commodity 
Base year 
2004 
Scenario 1 
2020 
Increased market share 
of isoglucose  
Increased market share 
of isoglucose 
   
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
Change with respect to Scenario 1 Change with respect to Scenario 1  
1000 tons 
1000 tons Per cent 
Sugar, total 5,174.8 1,392.2 -220.4 -114.5 59.6 -15.8 -8.2 4.3 
Total cereals 14,266.8 28,217.6 -209.8 -123.5 -11.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.0 
Oilseeds 663.2 1,205.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 11 shows the differences in exports between the with-quota and no-quota situations. When 
there are no sugar quotas and no substitution with isoglucose, exports are lower than in the 
quota-extension scenario. This is the direction of change predicted for EU exports by the 
theoretical model in Section 3. This negative impact is reduced in magnitude when a 10% 
isoglucose share in the sweetener market is assumed, and reversed in sign when the share is set 
at 20%.  
Impacts on exports of cereals are slightly negative, and these negative effects are smaller when 
the IG share of the sweetener market is higher. When interpreting these results, it should be 
borne in mind that no adjustment has been made for the fact that higher production of isoglucose 
in the EU will increase demand for maize and wheat as ingredients for EU-produced isoglucose. If 
this adjustment were made, then the shrinking of the negative impacts on exports as isoglucose 
share increases would probably be a little more marked.  
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Combining these results for trade flows with those for EU production in Table 8, we see that, in the 
case of a 20% isoglucose share, not only are EU beet and ‘sugar’ production almost the same as in 
the quota-extension scenario, but also that the main adjustment burden due to removing sugar 
and isoglucose quotas, plus the assumed aggressive expansion of the isoglucose sweetener share, 
is borne by imports, and in particular by imports from high-cost exporting countries with duty-free 
access to the EU market. 
In terms of Figure 2, increasing the isoglucose share of the EU sweetener market corresponds to a 
shift to the left of the demand curve in panel 3 of the figure, and a corresponding leftwards shift of 
the EU’s demand for duty-free imports in panel 4. We would expect this to be accompanied by 
lower beet and sugar prices within the EU (which is confirmed by the results for prices given below 
in Table 14), and a fall in duty-free imports. The fact that imports from Brazil react relatively little 
only to the lower EU prices is consistent with the discussion in the theoretical section (p.15) 
regarding the elasticity of Brazilian import supply over the range of prices relevant to this scenario 
comparison.  
Finally, as already pointed out, EU exports fall as predicted by the theory, but do not disappear as 
would be expected if trade flows depended only on relative prices. After quota expiry, when 
unlimited quantities of sugar can be sold on the EU market, basic theory suggests that the EU 
market would always be preferred to the world market as long as the EU price is above the world 
market price. However, as discussed in Section 3 (p.22), in the real world this may not be the 
case. Furthermore, as explained in footnote 18, CAPRI uses information on past trade flows and 
preferences as well as current relative prices to determine trade flows, and to allow for 
simultaneous flows of imports and exports even when, on the basis of relative prices alone, one 
would expect trade to flow in one direction only.  
6.2 EU production balances and welfare changes. 
Table 12 summarises the production, domestic use and trade figures of the different scenarios. 
The new information provided by this table relates to human consumption of sugar in the different 
scenarios, and a more detailed breakdown of sugar beet use. 
In the first quota-expiry scenario (with no substitution between sugar and IG), there is almost no 
increase in sugar consumption, in line with the very low price elasticity of demand for this product. 
However, when it is assumed that isoglucose takes an increasing share of the sweetener market, 
EU sugar consumption is markedly lower in line with the assumptions about isoglucose share in the 
total sweetener market. The balance sheet in Table 12 reveals where the sugar displaced by 
isoglucose goes. First, the lower demand for sugar for human consumption gets signalled back to 
beet producers (via price) and they produce less beet (although still a little more than in the 
quota-extension scenario, even with a 20% IG share). Second, the fall in the use of beet for 
ethanol production is less marked (again, as a result of lower market price for beet), and third, the 
impact on sugar imports, especially from high-cost sources, is greater (as already shown in Table 
10). Thus, the impact of the higher IG share in the sweetener market on beet producers is 
dampened by these adjustments in related markets. 
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Table 12. Sugar and derived product balances. 
Scenario 
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
Scenario
2.00 
Scenario 
2.10 
Scenario 
2.20 
 
Scenario 1 
2020 
Increased market 
share of IG 
Increased market 
share of IG 
  
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
No IG 
substit-
ution IG=10% IG=20% 
Change relative to Scenario 1 Change relative to Scenario 1  
1000 tons 
1000 tons Per cent 
Production                                                                     1000 Tons of Sugar Beet 
Sugar beet 
Total 126,442.3 4,902.5 2,976.4 194.8 3.9 2.4 0.2 
EU15 101,798.1 4,235.1 2,618.7 261.4 4.2 2.6 0.3 
EU12 24,644.2 667.5 357.7 -66.5 2.7 1.5 -0.3 
For processing2 125,618.2 4,878.5 2,961.7 193.3 3.9 2.4 0.2 
For animal feed 575.8 16.0 9.0 -0.9 2.8 1.6 -0.2 
Other uses + losses 447.4 9.7 7.0 3.2 2.2 1.6 0.7 
1000 Tons of Sugar Equivalent1 
Total sugar 20,096.7 851.5 539.7 67.5 4.2 2.7 0.3 
EU15 16,257.1 757.2 493.4 90.0 4.7 3.0 0.6 
EU12 3,839.6 94.3 46.3 -22.5 2.5 1.2 -0.6 
Of which:            Ethanol 6,088.8 -799.2 -475.1 67.2 -13.1 -7.8 1.1 
Other uses + losses 251.1 27.2 30.3 35.7 10.8 12.1 14.2 
Human Consumption 
Sugar 16,380.3 127.1 -1,008.3 -2,626.5 0.8 -6.2 -16.0 
Imports 
Sugar 4,031.1 -1,716.8 -2,108.3 -2,534.1 -42.6 -52.3 -62.9 
Exports 
Sugar 1,392.2 -220.4 -114.5 59.6 -15.8 -8.2 4.3 
1. Note that, in this segment of the table, ‘total sugar’ refers to all products derived from sugar beet (including 
industrial products), measured in white sugar equivalents. 
2. Here processing includes transformation into sugar for human consumption.  
 
Three further points are worth making. First, production impacts are relatively greater in EU15 
than in EU12. This is partly due to the very large impact in Germany, which dominates the EU15 
response. Germany, where the fall in revenue per hectare of beet is the smallest after quota expiry 
(see Table 17), is alone responsible for about one half of the EU27 net increase (see Table 15). 
Moreover, the largest positive differentials between the out-of-quota price (in Scenario 1) and the 
uniform sugar price (Scenario 2) are found in Member States of EU1533. The dominant impact of 
Germany persists in all three no-quota scenarios: in Scenario 2.20, the increase in Germany is 
about two and a half times the net increase for EU27 as a whole, whereas production in EU12 is 
actually lower than in Scenario 1 (quotas extended).  
Second, it is not only the EU12 production impact that has a sign change in Scenario 2.20. Other 
variables whose impacts are different in direction in Scenario 2.20 are ethanol production and EU 
exports (which are higher relative to the quota-extension scenario, although they are lower in 
Scenarios 2.00 and 2.10); this phenomenon is explained by the lower beet and sugar prices in 
Scenario 2.20. Clearly, there is a tipping point somewhere between isoglucose shares of 10% and 
                                                 
33 Member States in which this differential exceeds 10%, when comparing Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.00, are 
ES (25.6), DK (21.3), RO (20.1), DE(20.0), FI (15.3), UK (15.3), and IT (14.3). 
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20%, beyond which some of the impacts of quota expiry go in a different direction. A more in-
depth analysis of the interactions between the sugar and isoglucose markets, using empirically 
based estimates of substitution elasticities, would shed further light on this issue.  
Three, the sign reversal for human sugar consumption that occurs when passing from scenario 
2.00 to scenario 2.10 and the explanation for this change are more complex. The change in human 
consumption is the net result of the lower sugar price (which gives a small stimulus to internal 
sugar consumption) and the substitution away from sugar towards isoglucose implied by the 
assumption of a larger isoglucose share in the total sweetener market. By the time the expanding 
isoglucose reaches 10%, the second (negative) effect already outweighs the first (positive) effect.   
Table 13. Impact of quota expiry on welfare in the EU. 
Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2.10 Scenario 2.20 
No isoglucose 
substitution Isoglucose share=10% Isoglucose share=20% 
 
Scenario 1 
Change with respect to Scenario 1 
 EUR mn EUR mn % EUR mn % EUR mn % 
Total welfare 7,533,485.0 1,110.9 0.02 1,002.8 0.01 778.5 0.01 
Consumer surplus 7,519,115.0 1,043.5 0.01 1,171.8 0.02 1,304.5 0.02 
Total agricultural 
income 182,680.7 98.7 0.05 -137.1 -0.08 -488.7 -0.27 
TRQ rents1 493.4 -32.8 -6.66 -40.8 -8.26 -52.4 -10.62 
Tax payers cost 51,206.6 -0.3 -0.00 -10.3 -0.02 -25.8 -0.05 
Tariff revenues 5,405.8 1.8 0.03 0.1 0.00 -3.1 -0.06 
Sugar beet income  1,308.5 -225.8 -17.25 -391.2 -29.90 -622.8 -47.59 
1. The quota rents are assumed to be shared in equal parts between importers and exporters. TRQ rent 
accruing to EU importers is included in the total EU welfare change. 
Table 13 compares the welfare effects of the two scenarios. It should be borne in mind that, due to 
the partial equilibrium specification of the CAPRI model, these are partial effects and summarise 
changes in welfare in the EU agriculture and food sectors only. If the policy change examined here 
has knock-on welfare effects for agents in other sectors of the economy, they are ignored in these 
totals. However, when comparing the situation with and without sugar quotas, it can be safely 
assumed that welfare differences in other sectors are extremely small. At the same time, it should 
also be borne in mind that there are non-trivial welfare differences in other, non-EU countries and 
specifically in ACP countries and LDCs that export sugar to the EU. These impacts are not shown in 
Table 13.  
The welfare changes are very small, and consist almost entirely of a small gain to EU sugar 
consumers as a result of lower sugar prices. The impact on sugar beet income at EU27 level is 
negative and substantial, and the magnitude of this negative impact increases with isoglucose 
substitution. When no substitution between sugar and isoglucose is assumed, the net effect on 
agricultural income is positive although small, indicating that gains to commodities other than 
sugar beet offset the fall of the beet income. However, when isoglucose substitution with sugar is 
assumed, which leads to lower beet prices and less beet production, gains to other commodities in 
the sector are insufficient to offset the fall in beet income. The incidence of these agricultural 
income changes on Member States and regions is examined in Section 6.3.  
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6.3  Changes at Member State level 
This sub-section reports changes in prices, production, acreage and revenue at the level of 
Member States. It begins by presenting the impacts on prices received by beet growers, since this 
price, in conjunction with the comparative and competitive advantage enjoyed by each Member 
State, is crucial for explaining the impacts on the other variables.  
Table 14. Changes in sugar beet prices in Member States. 
  Scenario 11 Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2.10 Scenario 2.20 
 Euro/ton Euro/ton Euro/ton Euro/ton 
Austria  33.2 28.2 27.1 25.4 
Belgium  33.4 28.4 27.2 25.5 
Czech Republic  33.0 27.7 26.8 25.6 
Denmark  37.0 31.4 30.1 28.2 
Finland  35.1 29.9 28.6 26.8 
France  32.6 27.7 26.6 24.9 
Germany  36.6 31.1 29.8 27.9 
Greece  32.7 27.8 26.6 25.0 
Hungary  33.0 27.7 26.8 25.6 
Italy  34.8 29.6 28.4 26.6 
Lithuania  33.4 28.1 27.2 25.9 
Netherlands  32.6 27.7 26.5 24.8 
Poland  32.9 27.7 26.8 25.5 
Romania  33.0 31.1 30.4 29.3 
Slovakia  33.4 28.1 27.2 25.9 
Spain  38.3 32.5 31.2 29.2 
Sweden  32.8 27.9 26.7 25.0 
United Kingdom  35.2 29.9 28.6 26.8 
EU272, average 34.2 29.1 27.9 26.2 
1. The sugar beet price in Scenario 1 corresponds to the in-quota price; the out-of-quota price is 25.9€/ton. 
2. Excluding the Azores and the French overseas departments. 
 
Table 14 shows the prices in each Member State in the four scenarios. In the quota-extension 
scenario, France and the Netherlands have the lowest beet price (€32.6/t). The average price for 
EU27 is 5% higher than this minimum price, and 10 other Member States have prices that exceed 
the minimum by less than 3%. The six remaining Member States have prices above the EU 
average, and in excess of the French and Dutch price by the following amounts: Italy (+6.7%), 
Finland (+7.7%), UK (+8.0%), Germany (+12.3%), Denmark (+13.5%) and Spain (+17.5%). 
These differentials between countries are more or less maintained for the Member States of EU25 
in the quota-expiry scenarios, since the price reduction is comparable across Member States34: for 
Scenario 2.00 it is in the range -14.8% to -16.1%, for Scenario 2.10 between -18.4% and -
18.8%, and for Scenario 2.20 between -22.4% and -23.9%. It is only in Scenario 2.20 that the 
price goes below the out-of-quota beet price of €25.9/t in force for the with-quota scenario, and 
that occurs in seven Member States. The price reduction in Romania is less than in the other 
Member States: -5.8% in Scenario 2.00, increasing to -11.2% in Scenario 2.20. These results put 
                                                 
34 This is largely due to the way CAPRI achieves market equilibrium, solving for the three blocs EU15, EU12 and 
EU2 (BG and RO). 
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Romania among the four highest-priced Member States in Scenario 2.00 (along with Germany, 
Denmark and Spain) and with the highest price (along with Spain) in Scenario 2.20.  
Table 15 reports the differences in production at Member State level. In this table, production 
includes all products derived from beet expressed in sugar equivalents, whereas ‘quota’ relates to 
the commodity sugar, for sale on the EU market for human consumption, and the corresponding 
quantities of beet required to produce this ‘quota sugar’. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the 
with-quota situation, beet production in most Member States is well in excess of quota levels, 
since it also includes beet destined for non-food uses.  
In Scenario 1, the 18 mainland Member States still producing beet have an aggregate production 
level in white sugar equivalent that is about 57% above the aggregate EU quota level for sugar for 
human consumption. Only in Greece is beet production below the level implied by the national 
sugar quota.  
With quota expiry, total EU production of ‘sugar’ (all beet-derived products, measured in sugar 
equivalents) is higher by 851 thousand tons (4.2%). As shown in Table 12, this results in higher 
production of the commodity sugar (which is used to replace imported sugar). Despite the higher 
production, less beet is used for ethanol production, which now faces the internal market price.  
In the scenario without IG substitution, only the Netherlands and Greece have lower ‘sugar’ 
production compared with the with-quota situation. In Scenario 1, total ‘sugar’ production in 
Greece is only 54% of the quota limit for sugar for human consumption; thus, quota is not a 
constraint in Greece and therefore when quotas expire, Greek producers react only to the price fall 
with no offsetting incentive from the removal of a binding constraint or increase in the price of out-
of-quota sugar.  
A slightly different explanation applies to the Netherlands, whose total ‘sugar’ output is just 104% 
of its sugar quota. Clearly, in the Netherlands – a small country where sugar beet competes with 
other high-value crops – beet is not attractive at the level of production achieved in Scenario 1 
unless it earns the high in-quota price. Therefore, the removal of the quota constraint is over-
ridden by the fall in relative profitability. 
It should be pointed out that the extent of quota overshoot in Scenario 1 reflects not only cost-
efficient production at the margin, but also in some cases (including Germany) strong local 
demand for beet as an ethanol feedstock. As reported in Table 1, six of the eight Member States 
producing bio-ethanol are in EU15. 
Therefore, a number of factors lie behind the different initial positions (Scenario 1) and the 
differential impacts of quota expiry (Scenario 2) of Member States that are summarised in the 
table. They include absolute competitivity (in terms of net returns to sugar beet), the competitive 
position of sugar beet vis-à-vis other crops, and the presence of an ethanol industry. 
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 Table 15. Sugar production1 in Member States2 in 2020. 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2.10 Scenario 2.20 
  
Quota Product’n 
Position 
wrt quota 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
  1000 t % 1000 t % 1000 t % 1000 t % 
Austria  351.03 602.8 171.7 21.3 3.5 11.8 2.0 -2.6 -0.4 
Belgium  676.24 995.6 147.2 36.7 3.7 18.1 1.8 -10.0 -1.0 
Czech Republic 372.46 695.7 186.8 16.1 2.3 7.2 1.0 -5.8 -0.8 
Denmark  372.38 517.5 139.0 32.7 6.3 25.4 4.9 14.3 2.8 
Finland  80.99 101.8 125.7 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 
France  3,004.81 4,951.8 164.8 125.1 2.5 51.6 1.0 -63.8 -1.3 
Germany  2,898.26 5,056.2 174.5 422.2 8.4 322.3 6.4 172.0 3.4 
Greece  158.70 85.4 53.8 -2.3 -2.7 -2.9 -3.4 -3.9 -4.5 
Hungary  105.42 164.8 156.3 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 
Italy  508.38 609.6 119.9 17.8 2.9 10.8 1.8 -0.3 -0.1 
Lithuania  90.25 160.4 177.7 4.6 2.9 2.6 1.6 -0.3 -0.2 
Netherlands 804.88 834.2 103.6 -1.6 -0.2 -12.0 -1.4 -28.5 -3.4 
Poland 1,405.60 2,495.7 177.6 60.1 2.4 27.2 1.1 -19.5 -0.8 
Romania 104.68 118.3 113.0 6.7 5.6 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.5 
Slovakia 112.32 204.7 182.2 6.3 3.1 3.5 1.7 -0.4 -0.2 
Spain 498.48 584.7 117.3 8.5 1.5 6.2 1.1 2.4 0.4 
Sweden 293.19 407.2 138.9 15.6 3.8 6.4 1.6 -6.5 -1.6 
Un. Kingdom 1,056.47 1,506.2 142.6 79.5 5.3 54.4 3.6 16.3 1.1 
Total, EU272  12,894.54 20,096.7 155.9 851.5 4.2 539.8 2.7 67.5 0.3 
1.  Note that ‘sugar production’ here includes all products derived from sugar beet, expressed in white sugar 
equivalents.  
2.  Nine Member States are not listed in the table, because they do not grow sugar beet. These Member States 
are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. 
3.  Excluding the French overseas departments and the Azores. 
It is only in Scenario 2.20 (quota expiry and a 20% isoglucose share) that other Member States 
join Greece and Netherlands in having a production level lower than in Scenario 1. In fact, only 
four Member States (RO, DE, DK, UK) still have more production than in Scenario 1 once 
isoglucose takes a 20% share of the sweetener market. This is unrelated to the relative size of 
their over-quota ‘sugar’ in Scenario 1 —although Germany has the fifth-highest overshoot, the UK 
and Denmark come only 10th and 11th in the ranking, and Romania has the third-smallest 
overshoot.  
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Table 16. Beet areas in Member States1 in 2020. 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2.10 Scenario 2.20 
  
Area 
Share of 
MS’s 
UAA 
Share of 
EU27 
beet area 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
  ‘000 ha % ‘000 ha % ‘000 ha % ‘000 ha % 
Austria  52.7 1.7 2.9 1.6 3.1 0.8 1.6 -0.4 -0.7 
Belgium  68.4 4.4 3.8 2.2 3.2 0.9 1.4 -0.9 -1.3 
Czech Republic  72.0 1.9 4.0 1.9 2.6 0.9 1.3 -0.3 -0.5 
Denmark  46.8 1.8 2.6 2.7 5.8 2.1 4.4 1.2 2.5 
Finland  16.9 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 
France2  403.6 1.4 22.4 9.1 2.3 3.3 0.8 -5.2 -1.3 
Germany  415.6 2.4 23.1 32.5 7.8 24.5 5.9 12.8 3.1 
Greece  10.6 0.2 0.6 -0.3 -2.6 -0.3 -3.1 -0.4 -4.1 
Hungary  17.6 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Italy  61.6 0.5 3.4 1.6 2.6 0.9 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 
Lithuania  19.5 0.7 1.1 0.6 3.0 0.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands  79.2 4.2 4.4 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 -1.6 -2.7 -3.4 
Poland  267.8 1.7 14.9 6.8 2.5 3.3 1.2 -1.5 -0.6 
Romania  26.5 0.2 1.5 1.5 5.5 1.3 4.8 1.0 3.7 
Slovakia 22.1 1.1 1.2 0.7 3.2 0.4 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Spain  46.4 0.2 2.6 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 
Sweden  42.6 1.3 2.4 1.4 3.4 0.6 1.4 -0.7 -1.6 
U. Kingdom  130.8 0.8 7.3 6.2 4.8 4.1 3.1 1.0 0.8 
Total, EU271 1801.0 1.0 100.0 68.7 3.8 42.1 2.3 3.9 0.2 
1.  Nine Member States are not listed in the table, because they do not grow sugar beet. These Member States 
are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, continental Portugal and Slovenia. 
2.  Excluding the French overseas departments. 
 
Table 16 presents figures at Member State level for beet area that are largely in line with those for 
‘sugar’ production in Table 15.  
Table 16 also shows that the share of EU beet area increases in four Member States (Romania, 
Denmark, Germany and the UK, all of which have percentage increases in area that are greater 
than the increase in total EU area), while shares are lower in the other Member States.  
Table 17 compares the average revenue per hectare of beet production received by beet growers 
across the Member States. In Scenario 1, the Member States where the highest revenue per 
hectare is earned are Spain and Belgium, with over €3,000 per hectare of beet grown. They are 
closely followed by the Netherlands and France, with €2909 and 2867 per hectare, respectively. By 
contrast, Poland, Romania and Finland have revenue per hectare of less than €2,000.  
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Table 17. Beet revenue per hectare in Member States1 in 2020.  
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2.00 Scenario 2. 10 Scenario 2.20 
  Revenue Difference from Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
Difference from 
Scenario 1 
 Euro/ha Euro/ha % Euro/ha % Euro/ha % 
Austria  2,590.9 -140.1 -5.4 -226.9 -8.8 -353.7 -13.7 
Belgium  3,149.5 -233.3 -7.4 -340.1 -10.8 -496.0 -15.7 
Czech Republic  2,119.6 -124.9 -5.9 -183.9 -8.7 -264.8 -12.5 
Denmark  2,294.8 -143.7 -6.3 -223.2 -9.7 -339.2 -14.8 
Finland  1,582.2 -135.6 -8.6 -187.3 -11.8 -262.6 -16.6 
France  2,867.3 -181.2 -6.3 -274.9 -9.6 -411.7 -14.4 
Germany  2,643.4 -61.8 -2.3 -154.3 -5.8 -289.5 -11.0 
Greece  2,318.6 -323.5 -14.0 -398.5 -17.2 -507.6 -21.9 
Hungary  2,226.8 -153.9 -6.9 -214.3 -9.6 -297.1 -13.3 
Italy  2,185.2 -195.4 -8.9 -267.8 -12.3 -373.5 -17.1 
Lithuania  2,005.1 -100.1 -5.0 -154.8 -7.7 -229.9 -11.5 
Netherlands  2,905.9 -359.6 -12.4 -452.8 -15.6 -588.9 -20.3 
Poland  1,850.9 -118.9 -6.4 -171.3 -9.3 -243.3 -13.1 
Romania  1,786.4 0.6 0.0 -31.3 -1.8 -78.6 -4.4 
Slovakia  2,216.8 -125.9 -5.7 -186.4 -8.4 -269.3 -12.2 
Spain  3,150.2 -305.3 -9.7 -417.3 -13.2 -580.8 -18.4 
Sweden  2,148.2 -158.4 -7.4 -224.0 -10.4 -319.8 -14.9 
U. Kingdom  2,532.7 -168.3 -6.6 -253.3 -10.0 -377.5 -14.9 
EU272, average 2,512.0 -146.4 -5.8 -228.5 -9.1 -347.3 -13.8 
1.  Nine Member States are not listed in the table, because they do not grow sugar beet. These Member States 
are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. 
2.  Excluding the Azores and the French overseas departments. 
 
It might be expected that, in Scenario 1, revenue per hectare of beet would be higher for those 
Member States with a higher share of quota beet in total beet output, since quota beet receives a 
higher price. This turns out not to be the case; the simple correlation coefficient between revenue 
per hectare and the quota fill rate (see column 3 of Table 15) is -0.07, denoting independence 
between these two variables. By contrast, there is a tendency for Member States with a higher 
beet yield35, and a higher sugar yield from beet, to have higher revenue from beet per hectare. 
Finland, whose average yield in 2007-2010 was less than half that of France and Spain has about 
half the revenue per hectare in these two countries in Scenario 1, and the lowest revenue per 
hectare of the 18 beet-producing Member States.  
There is a negative, but rather weak, correlation (0.27) between the level of average revenue per 
hectare in Scenario 1, and the absolute magnitude of the impact on revenue per hectare of quota 
expiry. This suggests a weak tendency for Member States with high revenue per hectare in 
Scenario 1 to experience a greater fall in revenue per hectare, but there are individual exceptions 
to this tendency.  
                                                 
35 See Figure 1, Section 2 for evidence on current yields for Member States.  
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What is striking is the strong link between the quota fill rate and the size of the impact on 
revenue, with the impact being smaller the more out-of-quota beet was produced in Scenario 1. 
This is illustrated dramatically by Greece and the Netherlands: Greece produces well below quota 
in Scenario 1 and the Netherlands has only a small overshoot. This means that in Scenario 1 all 
the beet produced in Greece, and nearly all the beet grown in the Netherlands, receives the in-
quota price. Hence, the impact on average revenue per hectare of moving to a single sugar market 
price when quotas expire is greatest for these Member States (-14.0% and -12.4%, respectively), 
since all or nearly all the beet they produce suffers a price cut. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic, with fill rates of over 170%, 
have falls in revenue per hectare between -2.3% and -6.4% only, since although the price falls on 
their in-quota production, it improves for the considerable share of their output that was 
previously out-of-quota. The simple correlation coefficient between the fill rate in Scenario 1 and 
the absolute size of the change in revenue when passing to Scenario 2.00, is -0.62, and after 
dropping Romania (whose price behaviour has already been discussed) it is -0.91. This shows that 
higher fill rates in Scenario 1 are strongly associated with smaller per hectare revenue falls when 
quotas expire. 
Table 18. Rankings of Member States by beet revenue per hectare, Scenarios 1 
and 2.20. 
Scenario ES BE NL FR DE AU UK 
EU 
27 
GR DK HU SK IT SW CZ LIT PO RO FI 
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
2.20 2 1 5 3 4 6 8 7 12 9 11 10 14 15 13 16 18 17 19 
 
Despite the differential rates of change in revenue per hectare across Member States, the ranking 
of Member States according to their revenue per hectare of beet is very similar in Scenario 2.20 
compared with Scenario 1 (see Table 18). The exceptions are the Netherlands and Greece, which 
slip several places in the ranking, and the UK, which falls below the EU27 average. Otherwise, the 
rearrangement in the ranking of Member States is relatively minor.  
 
6.4 Changes at NUTS2 level 
Figures 4 and 5 show the changes in 2020 in sugar beet production and sugar beet income at 
NUTS2 level, relative to the quota-extension scenario.  
First, it must be emphasised that these changes are not standardised to control for the size of the 
region or the area of sugar beet grown in the region. Hence, a large negative change can occur 
because (a) the region itself is large, although sugar beet is not grown particularly intensively 
there and is not crucially important for the agriculture of the region, (b) the region itself is not 
large, but it specialises in sugar beet, which is therefore an important crop for the region, (c) both 
or neither of (a) and (b) but rather sugar beet production, to the extent that it is grown, is 
particularly strongly impacted by the expiry of sugar quotas. This way of presenting the result was 
preferred to the alternative of showing changes on a per hectare basis since in many cases this 
highlights the changes in marginal sugar beet areas (where production and income changes are 
likely to be more extreme) as very important when in reality sugar beet may be a very small crop. 
Another reason is that total income captures the price effect as well as the quantity effect and 
complements in this way the results on revenues. 
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Figure 4 gives the regional changes in sugar beet production. It shows that, in Scenario 2.00, the 
largest total declines are in southern Spain, parts of Italy, northern Greece, parts of Belgium and 
the Netherlands, the west of England and eastern Sweden. Most other regions see an increase in 
production. The increases tend to be smaller in Scenario 2.10, whereas in Scenario 2.20, regions 
that had strong production increases in Scenario 2.00 (such as north eastern France, southern 
Sweden and western Poland) have decreases that, in some cases, are very substantial. In Scenario 
2.20, only East Anglia, Denmark and parts of Germany still register strong production increases. 
Figure 5 presents the changes in sugar beet income on a regional basis. The income shown 
corresponds to revenue minus intermediate consumption (feed, fertiliser, plant protection, 
veterinary costs, seeds, maintenance and repair, fuel and energy). It is striking that all regions see 
a fall in income in all scenarios, although in a number of regions the decrease is small even in 
Scenario 2.20. It is also very surprising that some of the regions with production gains exhibit 
large income decreases even in Scenario 2.00 (East Anglia and north eastern France), and in 
Scenario 2.10, Denmark, southern Sweden and northern Spain are also in this category. North 
eastern and eastern France is badly hit, from Scenario 2.00 onwards, by falling production and 
falling income. 
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Figure 4. Change in sugar beet production (in 1000 tons) with respect to Scenario 1, by NUTS2 region. 
 
 
      Scenario 2.00        Scenario 2.10    Scenario 2.20 
 
 
 
 
        -60 to -25   -25 to 0             0     0 to 25         25 to 290  
 
 
 
Note: regions with no colour shading do not produce sugar beet. 
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Figure 5. Change in income from sugar beet (in million euros with respect to Scenario 1, by NUTS2 region. 
 
 
  Scenario 2.00            Scenario 2.10          Scenario 2.20 
 
 
   
 -60 to -10         -10 to -5        -5 to -2.5 -2.5 to -1.0 -1.0 to 0  
 
 
  
Note: regions with no colour shading do not produce sugar beet. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
This report has compared the production, market and trade outcomes of two alternative policy 
scenarios, expiry of EU sugar quotas in 2015/16 and extension of the current sugar quota scheme 
for an indefinite period. The year in which the comparison is situated is 2020. The CAPRI model 
was used for the simulations.  
In the presentation of the results, the impacts that can be expected when quotas expire are 
presented in the form of differences from the hypothetical scenario that the quota scheme is 
extended. The main findings are: 
• production of sugar beet and white sugar increases by around 4%,. 
• there is little net impact on the production of cereals, 
• total ethanol production hardly changes, but the importance of sugar as an ethanol feedstock 
declines by a few percentage points, 
• raw sugar imports from high-cost third countries decline very substantially, but those from the 
low-cost producer Brazil decrease only slightly, 
• EU sugar exports fall, 
• EU human consumption of sugar increases only marginally, despite a fall of 15-16% in beet 
prices for sugar for internal human consumption, 
• there is a very small positive welfare change, although income accruing to sugar beet 
producing sector falls by over 17%.  
These results are all in line with the predictions and explanations provided by the theoretical 
model. They also agree, as far as the direction of change is concerned, with the studies covered in 
the literature review, and in terms of their magnitude they occupy the middle ground between the 
highest and lowest impacts registered in the literature surveyed. On the issue of the assumed 
world price level, which was shown to be so crucial for the results in two of the studies reviewed, it 
should be pointed out that the assumed level of world prices in the with-quota scenario in this 
study is more or less in line with the ‘central’ projection of the AGLINK-COSIMO model.    
In addition, impacts are shown at Member State, and sub-Member State, levels. The main findings 
are: 
• impacts at Member State level are not uniform; all Member States except Greece and the 
Netherlands increase production, although beet revenue per hectare falls in all Member States 
(except Romania, where it is unchanged), 
• the size of the revenue fall (in absolute magnitude) is inversely correlated with the extent to 
which total sugar production (including sugar for industrial use) exceeded the sugar quota in 
the with-quota scenario, 
• the average fall in revenue per hectare across EU27 is -5.8%, 
• at NUTS2 level, impacts on production and income vary considerably across the EU and within 
some of the larger Member States, and some regions with strong production increases 
nevertheless experience substantial income declines. 
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The above summary refers to a scenario where it is assumed that sugar quotas expire and that – 
inevitably – isoglucose quotas are also removed, but there is no interaction between the markets 
for sugar and isoglucose. When it is assumed that an increasing share of the sweetener market is 
taken by isoglucose, the findings are modified as follows: 
• increases in beet and sugar production relative to the with-quota scenario are much smaller, 
and disappear for an isoglucose market share of 20%. 
• total ethanol production increases a little more, and the importance of sugar as an ethanol 
feedstock reverts towards its with-quota level due to the lower sugar price, 
• raw sugar imports from high-cost third countries decline even more than when there is no 
isoglucose interaction, and even those from the low-cost producer Brazil decrease a little more, 
• EU sugar exports fall by less than when there is no isoglucose interaction, and when isoglucose 
takes a 20% share of the sweetener market, exports are actually higher than in the with-quota 
scenario, 
• As the isoglucose share of the sweetener market increases, EU human consumption of sugar 
declines proportionately, while the size of the total sweetener market remains more or less the 
same, 
• the decline in income accruing to sugar beet producers is much greater,  
• the fall in sugar beet prices is steeper than when there is no isoglucose interaction; when 
isoglucose takes a 20% share of the sweetener market the price is 22-24% lower than in the 
with-quota scenario (depending on the Member State), and in seven Members States it falls to 
a level below the out-of-quota beet price in the with-quota scenario,  
• when isoglucose takes a 20% market share, only six Member States have a level of sugar 
production higher than in the with-quota scenario revenue per hectare is lower in all Member 
States and the EU27 average is 13.8% below its with-quota level, 
• at NUTS2 level, loss of market share to isoglucose exacerbates the diversity of impact across 
the EU, both between and within Member States and with, in particular, increasing negative 
pressure on many French regions, most of Poland and southern England. 
Clearly, the plausibility of the results would be enhanced if CAPRI contained an empirically-based 
depiction of the isoglucose sector and its interactions with the EU sugar market.  
It has not been possible easily to quantify the impacts on third countries in terms of welfare 
changes or changes in export revenues. When interpreting the very small welfare changes 
calculated for the EU, it should be borne in mind that other non-reported welfare changes outside 
the EU are also triggered, and that these changes might be quite concentrated on particular third 
countries or economic groups (producers or consumers).  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Conversion coefficients used in this study 
 
Sugarbeet to white sugar  
The processing coefficient varies across Member States, ranging from 1 ton beet = 0.12 ton sugar 
to 1 ton beet = 0.17 ton sugar (depending on the sugar content of the beet) 
 
Raw sugar to white sugar  
1 ton raw (cane) sugar = 0.935 ton white sugar 
 
Sugarbeet to ethanol 
1 ton sugar = 0.517 ton bioethanol (this coefficient is for calculation purposes only, since ethanol 
is processed directly from beet, not via sugar) 
Using the figures above for conversion from beet to sugar, we derive 
1 ton beet = 0.062 ton ethanol - 0.088 ton ethanol, depending on the sugar content of the beet 
 
Weights and volumes of biofuels 
1 litre bioethanol = 0.79 kg bioethanol 
1 litre biodiesel = 0.88 kg biodiesel 
1 ton bioethanol = 0.64 toe 
1 ton biodiesel = 0.86 toe  
Sugar and isoglucose (HFC42) 
1 ton syrup = 0.71 ton dry matter 
1 ton dry matter = 0.92 ton sugar (in terms of equivalent sweetness) 
Therefore, 1 ton syrup = 0.77 ton sugar (in terms of equivalent sweetness) 
Isoglucose and feedstocks 
1 ton isoglucose (dry weight) = 2.82 ton wheat 
1 ton isoglucose (dry weight) = 2.25 ton maize 
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high-cost third countries decline very substantially, but those from the low-cost producer Brazil decrease only slightly; EU sugar exports 
fall; EU human consumption of sugar increases only marginally, despite a fall of 15-16% in beet prices for sugar for internal human 
consumption; there is a very small positive welfare change, although income accruing to sugar beet producers falls by over 17%. 
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